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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview and Objectives
The crucial importance of security in China has been heightened by the
phenomenal growth of foreign investment in China,' much of which has been
preceded and accompanied by the adoption of the styles of foreign law into
the Chinese legal system.2 In examining the functioning of security in China's
legal system, this Article should appeal both to legal practitioners interested
in the intricacies of security in China and to readers interested in China's legal
system as a whole. Academics interested in the applications and extensions of
functional or systems theory should also find the empirical research and the
conclusions of this Article interesting.
"Taking security" in this context means the ability of one person to obtain
an enforceable interest in the property of another in order to secure the
performance of an obligation. Taking security thus refers not only to the
contractual ability to create a security interest, but also to the ability to
enforce the security interest. If the contractual obligation cannot be enforced
in practice, then one can only create security - a worthless exercise. If one
can enforce the contractual obligation but one receives a worthless piece of
property, then the ability to take security is also essentially meaningless (other
than perhaps for symbolic reasons). Taking security thus involves the ability
to liquidate the security or the ability to exchange the security for something
of value. In its function as a mechanism for encouraging performance of
contractual obligations and for ensuring a supply of credit, the ability to take
security is an important component of a market system.
Two important developments in China over the past several years have
been the growth of local legislation facilitating the ability of both domestic and
foreign entities to take security in China and the very recent enactment of
a national law on security.4 This law, anticipated when this article was first
written, is placed in context at the end of this article.
1. See Marc A. Sobel & Danian Zhang, The Evolution of Foreign Secured Lending in China:
Socialism and Property, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 185 (1989) (placing start of China's economic
transformation at 1978 when Deng Xiaoping declared that "modernization would replace Chairman Mao's
concept of political and class struggle as China's main objective.... Since that time, the world has
witnessed great changes in China, including the development of private entities, Sino-foreign joint
ventures, and the introduction of Western capital, science and technology.").
2. See William C. Jones et al., Law of the PRC iii (Dec. 28, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) ("What has not received so much attention is the establishment of a new legal system formed
on western models whose first overt step was the promulgation of six statutes in 1979.").
3. Christopher G. Oechsli, The Developing Law of Mortgages and Secured Transactions in the
People's Republic of China, 5 CHINA L. REP. 1, 1 (1988). For more recent developments, see discussion
infra Section III. The recent legislation has generally been enacted in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and
coastal cities encouraging foreign investment. Important reasons for the growth in such regulation are
China's need for foreign capital, including loans from banks and the need of commercial banks and other
entities to secure their loans with collateral. See Sobel & Zhang, supra note 1, at 185, 213.
4. Security Law of the People's Republic of China, 8th Nat'l People's Cong., 14th Sess., Standing
Comm. (June 30, 1995) (effective Oct. 1, 1995) (promulgated by Pres. Order No. 50 (June 30, 1995))
[hereinafter Security Law].
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The security legislation has generated many questions.' How does one
take security in China? How does one (if one can) enforce a security interest?
How does the approach to security in China differ from that in the United
States? The answers to these questions go to such basic issues as the status of
property rights and the enforcement of contractual obligations in general, and
provide insight into China's legal system as a whole. Many casual observers
tend either to condemn or to praise the Chinese legal system; reactions often
depend on oversimplified points of view. By focusing on how the system
actually functions as opposed to merely considering printed rules or foreign
press reports, one can develop a more sophisticated understanding of the
Chinese legal system.
In Section II on the Chinese legal system, I attempt to provide some
understanding of larger patterns in Chinese legal culture and the backdrop
against which the taking and enforcing of security has developed and takes
place. That section also provides a sense of historical progression without
engaging the reader in exhaustive historical analysis. The remainder of the
Article focuses quite specifically on the intricacies of creating, enforcing, and
liquidating security in China. The objective here is not to plunge the reader
into tedious, intricate details (although such details constitute increasingly
valuable information). Rather, by focusing on the specifics, the reader will
obtain a clearer picture of security in China and China's legal system as a
whole as it operates in practice.
I do not attempt in this Article to engage in profound analysis of United
States secured transactions law. As with the section on the Chinese legal
system, this feature of the Article is only intended to provide an important
backdrop against which to present Chinese secured transactions law. This
Article also does not go to great lengths to explicate Chinese regulations
(although local rules and regulations, where appropriate, are cited rather
extensively). The explication approach has been taken by other commentators,
but says very little about China's legal system as it actually functions.6
B. Analytic Framework
The approach used in this Article for analyzing Chinese secured
transactions law was developed by Lynn LoPucki and George Triantis in the
context of bankruptcy reorganizations. 7 Essentially, their method focuses on
5. Some observers question the extent to which recent Chinese legislation should be taken seriously.
As Jones states:
Although on paper modem China has all of the apparatus of a western legal system, it is a
country that is still heavily influenced by tradition, and any study of Chinese law that
concentrates solely on the statutes and institutions copied from the West is bound to come to
wrong conclusions. There still has to be a search for the elements of a legal system quite
unlike ours.
Jones et al., supra note 2, at 2.
6. In fairness to other commentators, this approach will probably prove more valid over time as
China's market economy progresses.
7. Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian
Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 267 (1994). This approach
focuses on the actual functions of mechanisms within a legal system itself rather than on legal doctrines
or legal constructs. Id. at 269-74. This approach is founded on the mainstream conception of systems as
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problems in a given area of the law (such as bankruptcy reorganization) and
describes the ways in which different legal systems deal with these problems.
The underlying theory is that two different legal systems will probably deal
with similar problems in similar ways. LoPucki and Triantis offer a unique
starting point for approaching similarities and differences among legal cultures
and understanding the methods these cultures use to deal with particular
problems such as security.
The approach taken in this Article touches on the ways in which
environmental or systemic factors affect the development of the law. Law
does not exist in a vacuum; much of the law takes its shape from
environmental factors.8 It is often true, however, that the law appears to
contradict certain elements of its surrounding environment.9 For example,
commercial or industrial practices may develop and exist by themselves quite
apart from written regulations.'" In the development of customary practices
and of law itself, historical, cultural, and political factors play an important
role. This Article, in its focus on functioning systems instead of on form,
anticipates distinctions between formal law and law in practice as well as the
powerful interaction between written law and its broadly understood
surrounding environment.
A functional or systems approach to the law is inherently empirical in
nature, as one cannot (particularly in the Chinese context) rely solely upon
arguments, theories, or written rules to describe the law. In keeping with this
approach, I have attempted to obtain as much empirical data as possible. The
greatest problem with analyzing the Chinese legal system in this way is
discovering empirical data such as actual cases of enforcement. One problem
is that there is very little published information concerning Chinese court
proceedings." Much of what is published arguably is published selectively
for the benefit of foreigners, or to highlight the progress China is making
toward a modern legal system. 12 From the statements of those closely
involved with China's legal system, it is evident that security is protected at
"'open systems' feeding upon exchanges with their environment." See Niklas Luhmann, Operational
Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System, 13 CARDozo L. REv. 1419,
1419 (1992).
This comparative approach differs from the traditional approach to comparative law. See Alan
Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1121, 1122 (1983)
("Traditional comparative law [which focuses on doctrinal law] does not seek systematically to explain
differences and similarities between legal rules and approaches to law in various systems.") (emphasis
added).
8. See Luhmann, supra note 7, at 1419.
9. Liang Zhiping, Explicating "Law%- A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal
Culture, 3 J. CHINESE L. 55 (1989).
10. See id.
11. See Stanley B. Lubman, Emerging Functions of Formal Legal Institutions in China's
Modernization, 2 CHINA L. REP. 195, 209 (1983) ("Selective publicity of cases, especially during the
proceedings before the outcome is formally known, raises obvious questions to the foreign observer about
the fairness of the trial and the distance between law and policy. .. ").
12. See, e.g., id. at 210. "[Tlhe Chinese leadership has been sensitive to foreign criticisms." The
article goes on to note that Fei Xiaotong, a leading Chinese sociologist and a member of a special tribunal
hearing a celebrated criminal case, was quoted as saying: "It would be improper to measure the case
against the criteria of Western laws or any other foreign laws or for others to try to pick holes in China's
legal proceedings." (quoting Jurist Fei Xiaotong Comments on Trial, FBIS, Feb. 2, 1981, at L9).
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some level. However, no matter how developed the system appears on paper,
enforcement depends to a great extent on local, national, practical, and
political considerations.
Empirical data for this Article were collected through interviews with
Chinese lawyers and materials examined in Hong Kong during the summers
of 1993 and 1994. This approach has proven helpful in other contexts where
there are few published sources or the primary source of legal culture is oral
tradition. 13 This approach is especially well tailored for analysis of the
Chinese legal system, where the actual functioning of the system often differs
substantially from what one would expect from an examination of published
sources, and where in many cases there are few published sources dealing
with these issues. 4
I have not neglected citations to written Chinese sources where such
sources are available. However, as indicated above, some of the best
information on Chinese law in practice lies in unwritten sources. Citation to
written sources is helpful for understanding China's efforts to put in place all
the trappings of a Western legal system. -Written sources also provide an
important context for understanding how things actually work in China
compared to how one might suppose they would work after reading the
published rules and regulations.
Finally, I have adopted a comparative approach throughout this Article.
No one will be surprised to learn that China's legal system is not yet as
developed as that of the United States. What may be surprising is the rapidity
with which China's legal system has developed and is beginning, both in
practice and on paper, to resemble more closely that of the United States.
The brief presentation of United States law is also given from a functional
perspective, and provides a helpful background for readers without substantial
grounding in United States secured transactions law. The drawback to this
approach is that the search for and presentation of equivalent mechanisms in
different systems can result in a somewhat distorted view of one or both
systems. I caution the reader in this regard because the comparison of United
States law with developing Chinese law in this Article results in the highly
developed United States law appearing somehow equivalent to Chinese law,
13. See, e.g., Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of
the Gypsies, 103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993). Weyrauch and Bell examine the functioning of the legal system
of the Romani people, otherwise known as Gypsies, whose system is, surprisingly to some, complex and
well developed. The authors glean information on the Gypsy legal system from anthropological studies,
noting the lack of legal scholarship on this issue. Id. at 339-40.
14. This way of looking at overlapping systems coexisting within a larger societal context is not
entirely new. See, e.g., William C. Jones, Some Questions Regarding the Significance of the General
Provisions of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 309, 318 (1987)
[hereinafter Jones, Questions] ("But the process just described is not, of course, the only legal system
operating in China. Every large country has more or less informal legal systems that function apart from
the formal legal system."); see also William C. Jones, An Inquiry into the History of the Adjudication of
MercantileDisputes in Great Britain and the United States, 25 U. Ci. L. REV. 445 (1958) (demonstrating
that Anglo-American formal commercial law since Middle Ages has often been overshadowed by
extrajudicial dispute resolution measures). A similar approach to gathering empirical data about the
informal Chinese legal system (or the system as it functions) is taken in Tahirih V. Lee, Risky Business:
Courts, Culture, and the Marketplace, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1335 (1993). Lee examines the court system
in pre-Communist China using interviews of Chinese lawyers as one source of empirical data.
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which is not the case.'
5
II. THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM
In order to compare United States and Chinese systems of taking security,
it is first necessary to obtain some perspective on the Chinese legal system as
a whole as it functions in practice. As others have said, any attempt to
describe the Chinese legal system merely in terms of recent legislation or legal
institutions overlooks important elements of the system.t6 In keeping, this
section presents an overview of the political, historical, and cultural context
within which the functioning of security has developed and is taking place in
China.
A. Formal Law and Developing Civil Law
Whatever "law" in China really means, most would agree that a
dichotomy exists between "paper law," or the law in published regulations,
and the law in action. 7 To some extent, this point is merely the expression
of a general understanding of law in any place.' However, the dichotomy
seems more exaggerated in China than in other countries. 19
To accommodate the needs of foreigners and to attract foreign investment,
the Chinese government has been adopting "foreign style" law at an
accelerated pace.2" Much of the resulting legislation is clearly based on
15. Cf. GEORGE JAMIESON, CHINESE FAMILY AND COMMERCIAL LAW 4-8 (1921) (noting close
similarity between Chinese family law and law of "primitive communities of Indo-European stock," but
warning that important differences also exist).
16. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at iii; see also Liang, supra note 9, at 55, 91 ("Law is an
inadequate translation of the underlying culture in China where law is not even conceptualized as the basic
organizing norm for society.").
17. See, e.g., Yu Xingzhong, Comment, Legal Pragmatism in the People's Republic of China, 3 J.
CHINESE L. 29, 30 (1989). Yu argues that Chinese pragmatism is reflected in China's present legal
system. This is seen in the resort to ad hoc legal measures, separation of legal doctrine from practice,
overemphasis on instrumental facets of laws, and the placement of policy before the law.
18. See LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 7, at 270.
19. William Alford, Chinese Living Law: An Interview with Professor William Alford, 7 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 135, 136 (1989) ("I think that in every society, including our own, there is a distance
between formal and actual law. This distance may be especially obvious in the People's Republic of
China. .. ").
20. See Sobel & Zhang, supra note 1, at 202 ("[Liocal laws and regulations have been enacted to
accommodate the special circumstances and needs of these locales and to attract foreign investors and
lenders who would insist upon collateralization of their loans."). The problem with characterizing China's
civil legislation as "foreign-style" is evident in the context of Weyrauch and Bell's "state" versus "private"
dichotomy. Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 13, at 398. Civil legislation is promulgated by the Chinese
government and as such constitutes the "official" law of China, or "state" law for purposes of the
Weyrauch and Bell analysis. However, this legislation is not based on traditional Chinese legislative
models, arguably has little relevance to Chinese social and economic realities or connection to practice,
and appears to be enacted primarily in an effort to attract (and appease) foreigners. Even so, it is having
some effect on China's legal system. The resolution is a perfect illustration of the dynamic principle
inherent in Weyrauch and Bell's thesis that
autonomous systems also have powerful influence in shaping state law. Just as oral traditions
and unarticulated cultural norms may play a great role in determining the outcome of disputes
in the formal justice system of the state, values in autonomous systems may gradually shape
the very substance of state law.
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foreign law models.21
It is unclear to what extent recent legislation reflects customary practice
in China. It is probably safe to say that most Chinese formal law, including
the recent "civil law" legislation, does not generally reflect customary
practice 2 and has not been developed with an eye to existing social
realities.' Certainly it has not been enacted to preserve the status quo. More
likely, recent legislation is viewed as an agent of social change in China or at
least as a statement of central government policy.24 Although officially
enacted, the recent legislation does not yet represent actual practice in China
- the law in action.' 5
Even though some Chinese regulations are increasingly complex and
comprehensive, large areas of civil life remain essentially unregulated.26 It
can be argued that even certain "regulated" areas are unregulated in practice.
This state of affairs virtually guarantees the continuing development of
customary practices in commercial matters outside of official channels.
Since the ascendancy in 1978 of Deng Xiaoping and other leaders
favoring market policies, political and practical necessities27 have contributed
to an ever-expanding and detailed body of Chinese legislation devoted entirely
to civil matters.2" The effects of the new legislation on commercial life in
China remain to be seen. It is probable that this legislation will further
encourage private commercial and economic activity.
21. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 186-90. The Civil Code is one example of the ongoing process
in China of incorporating styles of foreign law into the Chinese legal system; see also id. at iii. Other
examples of the areas in which foreign law has influenced the development of Chinese law include civil
procedure, criminal law, and criminal procedure.
22. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 166.
23. Roscoe Pound argued that the "Chinese should experiment with Chinese materials to solve
Chinese problems" instead of importing foreign legal doctrines and institutions. Yu, supra note 17, at 34.
Pound was a major proponent of American pragmatism, which began as an attack on legal formalism. It
takes as its basic premise the concept that the "truth, meaning, or value of ideas must be judged by their
practical consequences." Id. at 31.
24. See BARRETr L. MCCORMICK, POLrICAL REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA 125 (1990) (law in
China has remained a tool of state power used to enforce the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) will and
to maintain strict public security).
25. This phrase is attributable to Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV.
12 (1910) (discussing divergence of laws as administered from formal laws).
26. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at v ("There is, however, a significant area of Chinese life.., in
which there is no effective day-to-day control by the center. This is the economic activity being carried
on primarily by private individuals and local governing units of different types. . . ."); see also Sobel &
Zhang, supra note 1, at 201-02 ("Notwithstanding the fact that China still lacks encompassing national
legislation in these respects, mortgage loan transactions have often been conducted in China, especially
in Special Economic Zones and coastal open cities.").
27. See Sobel & Zhang, supra note 1, at 185. Such necessities undoubtedly include China's need
for foreign investment and capital. Serious questions remain as to the extent to which the new legislation
reflects social realities in China. It is highly probable that the Chinese government has merely
"discovered" civil law as a precision instrument for reaching economic and perhaps social goals.
28. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 166-74, 185-217. Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978 after
the death of Mao Zedong. The progress toward a market economy has been nothing short of phenomenal
since that time. The amount of new civil regulation each year is enormous. It remains to be seen what
effect, if any, the new legislation will have on Chinese law in action. Except in transactions involving
foreign parties, in which the impact of regulation is felt relatively quickly, it is doubtful that customary
practice between domestic Chinese parties has been significantly affected.
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B. Law and Practice: The Primacy of Policy
To comprehend the complex Chinese legal system, it is essential to grasp
some of the differences between the law in the books and the law in action.
It is critical to understand that policy is an essential component of Chinese law
and the legal system.29
In China's bureaucratic system, policy itself is law; or more precisely,
law is a tool of policy." This may have something to do with China's
Confucian tradition "wherein everyone in the empire owes a duty to the
Emperor whose word is law." 3 This may also have to do with the Stalinist
or Leninist system imposed on Chinese society by Mao Zedong in 1949.32
Mao repeatedly asserted the pre-eminence of policy.33
The importance of policy in China is inherent in its political structure, a
hierarchical bureaucracy that administers itself from top to bottom.34 The
Chinese political structure in practice, however, is not exactly a structurally
coherent, self-contained, and polished monolith. A complex web of informal
personal connections (guanxi) runs throughou 5 and beyond the formal
structure.
China's political structure influences the dispute resolution process.
29. See, e.g., 2 THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIc LEGAL SYSTEM, CHINESE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 153
(1969) ("The Policy of the Communist Party is the Soul of the People's Democratic Legal System; The
People's Democratic Legal System is the Tactic by Which the Policy of the Party is Realized.").
30. See Edward J. Epstein, China and Hong Kong: Law, Ideology, and the Future Interaction of the
Legal Systems, in THE FUTURE OF THE LAW IN HONG KONG 37, 45 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1989).
31. In many ways, Mao Zedong was the archetypal Chinese Emperor, and the modem Chinese
bureaucracy continues traditional Confucian Chinese government. As Stuart Schram states:
[l]f Mao saw in politics the 'leading thread' which always had priority over economics, and
ultimately shaped the pattern of social change, he was following in this not only Lenin, but
also the monistic and state-centered vision of the social order which had prevailed in China
for two thousand years.
STUART SCHRAM, THE THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG 144 (1989).
32. Although Mao Zedong certainly imposed a communist ideology on Chinese culture, the resulting
power structure arguably differed little from that of traditional China under other autocratic rulers.
33. Mao Zedong made one of the earliest statements on the pre-eminence of policy before 1949 in
the Yenan period. See SELECTED READINGS FROM THE WoRKs OF MAO TSETUNG 271 (1971) (at Yenan
Forum oi Literature and Art, May 23, 1942: "If everyone [agrees] on the fundamental policy, it should
be adhered to by all our workers, all our schools, publications, organizations .... It is wrong to depart
from this policy and anything at variance with it must be duly corrected."). Similarly, Schram quotes a
speech Mao gave at a Peitahe meeting on August 21, 1958:
You can't rely on law to rule the majority of the people; for the majority of the people you
have to rely on cultivating [the right] habits .... Every one of our [party] resolutions is a
law; when we hold a meeting, that's law too .... We do not rely on civil or criminal law to
maintain order. The National People's Congress and the State Council have their stuff (ta-men
na-i-t'ao), while we have this stuff of ours.
SCHRAM, supra note 31, at 90, 143.
34. See Epstein, supra note 30, at 42-45.
35. This network has outlasted a variety of government institutions. Lubman describes its
survival:
The success of Chinese Communism in focusing the allegiance and loyalty of hundreds of
millions of Chinese on the Chinese Communist Party and on the nation which the Party has
created has sometimes served to obscure the persistence of the smaller loyalties, the little
networks of personal influence, that preceded Communist rule and continue to exist in China
today. Mao recognized the extremes and dangers of such smaller loyalties within and despite
the Communist Party, and all but destroyed the Party trying to reform it.
Lubman, supra note 11, at 260.
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Indeed, law in China may be viewed as the decisions of officials with respect
to administrative decisionmaking. 6 This is partly because dispute resolution
in China is such an integral part of the decisionmaking process; there is no
independent judiciary in China.37 Judicial decisionmakers often consult with
supervisory administrators in seemingly unrelated government departments or
with other individuals holding no ascertainable government office. 8 Judicial
decisions are often made with reference to Chinese policy.39 Dispute
resolution in China is, in effect, a function of the entire administrative and
bureaucratic process."
Internal regulations, known as neibu,41 are an important part of the
Chinese legal system.4' The distinguishing characteristic of these regulations
is that they are almost entirely directed to government officials, not to the
public.43 By controlling government officials, the government is able to
influence private commercial activity. For example, the government can
regulate administrative approval processes. These are essentially
administrative acts directed or administered by policy.'
It appears that changes occurring in internal and published regulations,
36. This seems a reasonable conclusion given the highly administrative nature of the Chinese legal
system in which the courts themselves announce decisions only after consulting party officials from other
departments, including those in the procuracy and the security administration. Judicial decisions are often
reached in this manner before a case is even tried. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 49-54, 180-82.
37. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 245-49; see also Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics
and Dispute Resolution in Conmnunist China, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1284, 1325-28 (1967) [hereinafter Lubman,
Mao and Mediation] (describing politicization of judicial mediation).
38. See infra Section IV; Jones et al., supra note 2; see also Lee, supra note 14, at 1374-75.
39. See Epstein, supra note 30, at 44 ("Interestingly, the courts have not been similarly authorized
to apply policy although it is clear that they have always felt right in doing so.").
40. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 49-54.
41. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 47 ("One of the problems is that many of the statutes and
regulations of China even today are classified as being for 'internal use' (secret) and are not available to
foreigners or even to most Chinese.").
42. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 19, at 139 ("In the copyright area, there is no formal protection,
although the drafting of the copyright law has been underway for years. The Chinese, however, do have
a group of unpublished 'internal' or 'secret' laws which govern agreements between Chinese publishers
and their authors.").
43. See Alford, supra note 19, at 47-48 ("Those that are generally available consist, for the most
part, of 'statutes', 'directives', 'regulations', etc. of the Central government, though it is known that there
are many local regulations as well .... [Clommon to all of these laws ... is that they are almost entirely
directed to government officials, not to the public.").
44. Even though the approval process for foreign enterprises recently has been somewhat
streamlined, joint venture contracts must still be approved by the relevant department, usually MOFTEC
(but sometimes the SAIC as well), before they can become effective. See MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE
AND ECON. CO-OPERATION & STATE ADMIN. OF INDUSTRY AND COM., CIRCULAR OF THE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO FURTHER
STRENGTHENING THE EXAMINATION AND APPROVAL OF FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES AND CONTROL
OVER THEIR REGISTRATION (1994); see also MINISTRY OF FOREIGN ECON. RELATIONS AND TRADE,
ESSENTIAL POINTS TO EXAMINE AND INVESTIGATE & PRINCIPALS OF THE EXAMINATION AND APPROVAL
OF FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISE CONTRACTS AND ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION (Duijingmaozifa no. 432,
1991); MINISTRY OF FOREIGN ECON. RELATIONS AND TRADE, CONDUCTING EXAMINATION AND
APPROVAL OF THE CONTRACTS AND ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES
ACCORDING TO STATE LAW AND REGULATIONS (Waijingmaofahanzi no.4, 1993).
Other provisions illustrate the roles of MOFERT and SAIC regarding the examination, approval,
registration, and supervision of foreign invested enterprises. See Ministry of Foreign Econ. Relations and
Trade & State Admin. for Industry and Commerce, Some Provisions Concerning InvestmentsMade by
Various Parties in Sino-foreign Equity Joint Ventures arts. 6-10 (approved Dec. 30, 1987) (promulgated
Jan. 1, 1988).
192 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 183
whether national, regional, or local in scope, are often coordinated by the
central government.4' Subject to administrative guidance and molded by
bureaucratic policy, the changing set of internal regulations, guidelines, and
directives governing such administrative matters as approval processes
constitute a crucial part of China's legal system and its law in action.
The study of law in China must account for the importance of policy and
other unique elements inherent in the Chinese legal system. An analysis of the
differences between published law and law in practice in China facilitates
understanding. However, locating and gathering empirical data about the
Chinese legal system in operation is often difficult.46 Foreigners, as well as
many Chinese, often cannot easily gain access to internal regulations
governing administrative decisions.47 An investigation seeking to find
ordering principles must also in some way account for confusing phenomena
such as corruption48 and localism.49 Despite such obstacles, Chinese
methods demonstrate some general regularity. Perhaps legal principles can be
derived from observation of the Chinese legal system from a Chinese
perspective." If law is to be defined as "the decisions of officials," then
perhaps "law" in China means something much different than it does in the
United States.
An understanding of policy in China gives new meaning to the analysis
of China's paper law, which may be viewed as the crystallization or
45. See Clifford Chance, Commentary on the Security Law of the People's Republic of China I
(Sept. 15, 1995) (on file with author). That commentary states:
As a result of the rapid growth of the Chinese economy in recent years, the more prosperous
provinces and special economic zones have implemented regulations and measures on subjects
such as secured loans and, in particular, real estate mortgages, to fill the gap in national
legislation. Such fragmented developments form part of the not unfamiliar "incremental"
legislative approach in China whereby the central government evaluates the experience of local
legislatures on a subject before deciding on whether and, if so, how to legislate at the national
level. In the case of the Security Law, the gestation period is longer than usual in view of the
importance and scope of the subject matter as well as the need to balance different interests.
Id.
46. See Jones, Questions, supra note 14, at 331 ("[The Chinese] would have free access to the
materials on the basis of which such a study could be made; it is doubtful that outsiders ever will.").
47. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 47. These consist of central government "statutes,"
"directives," "regulations," and local regulations.
48. See Judicial Agencies Should Take the Lead in Fighting Corruption and Encouraging Clean
Administration, LEGAL DAILY, Oct. 11, 1993, at 1, reprinted in FBIS-CHI-93-204, Oct. 25, 1993, at 21.
Significantly, this Chinese publication actually admits to the corruption problem's existence. See also
Kevin Murphy, China's "Stir-fiy' Begins to Cool, Bus. REV. WKLY., Oct. 1, 1993, at 45, available in
LEXIS, Asia & Pacific Rim Library, Asia/Pacific News File ("Cosy relationships between bank officials
and government officials ... are just one target of a new national campaign against corruption, which
Beijing admits is at its worst since the 1949 revolution.").
49. By localism I mean favoritism shown toward local interests over outside interests. Localism may
be directed against other Chinese from outside the locality. A concurrent growth in local government
power and local officials flouting central government authority has accompanied China's rapid economic
growth. See, e.g., Martin Wolf, Zooming in on the Threat of Inflation, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1994, at 3;
Anne Thurston, A Society at a Crossroads: Chinese Society Faces Change in Values with Economic
Growth, CHINA Bus. REV., May-June 1994, at 16-20, available in LEXIS, Asia & Pacific Rim Library,
Asia/Pacific News File; Gerald Segal, The Muddle Kingdom? China's Changing Shape, FOREIGN AFF.,
May-June 1994, at 43; Murphy, supra note 48, at 45.
50. See generally Jones et al., supra note 2. Professor Jones analyzes the Chinese legal system by
attempting to identify the elements that the Chinese themselves see as significant.
1996] Taking Security in China 193
embodiment of policy,5" but which may have particular significance and
permanence in the form of actual published legislation.52 The statements of
government officials are also important, as they may contain important clues
to present policy. Even the Chinese courts may look to such statements as a
judge looks to case precedent in the United States.53
C. Historical and Cultural Influences
1. The Imperial Legacy
It is possible to view the modern Chinese bureaucratic state as continuing
in the mode of the traditional Chinese Empire.54 Essentially, the central
government is more concerned with obtaining bureaucratic compliance with
its policies than with controlling individual decisionmakers in the economy.55
The central government promulgates rules primarily to control the vast
Chinese bureaucracy.56 The implementation of central government rules
depends upon local and provincial bureaucrats. The implication of this unique
regulatory orientation is that large areas of civil life in China have remained
relatively free from direct government intervention. 7
The Chinese regulatory approach has shifted in recent years to direct
regulation of private economic actors. Historically, however, because the
Emperor was concerned primarily with maintaining order, his attention, and
likewise the attention of local bureaucrats, was only incidentally drawn to
51. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 191-99.
52. See Jones, Questions, supra note 14. Professor Jones explains that the promulgation of a
Western-style Civil Code may cause the entrenchment of Western concepts of rights in Chinese society.
Potentially, increased reliance on such rules will influence law in action and cause the Chinese legal system
to become somewhat more rigid.
Perhaps a concern with this possible permanence motivates the Chinese regulatory authorities to
designate all new laws and regulations as "interim" or "provisional." They seemingly could provide for
future amendments in another way. Yet they continue to appear wary of introducing permanent changes
into Chinese law. Clearly, they still view law as a tool of social policy in China (as are most other things),
which may be removed when it outlives its usefulness.
53. See Epstein, supra note 30, at 43-44; see, e.g., Central News Agency, Peking Averse to Honor
Guarantees of State Enterprises, July 9, 1990, available in LEXIS, Asia & Pacific Rim Library,
Asia/Pacific News File (administrative agencies refused to honor loan guarantees to foreign banks citing
reforms of recent years (bankruptcy laws) which made Chinese enterprises responsible for their own profits
and losses); see also Ku Ch'un-teh, RENMIN RiBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Nov. 7, 1978, at 3, translated in
1144 CHINA NEWS ANALYSIS, Dec. 22, 1978, at 3, 3 ("Our laws are inadequate. The naming of crimes
is not [consistent]; sanctions are uncertain. . .. The practice of the courts over many years has shown that
the courts have only the Party Line, Directive and Party Policy, but no laws for following these out.").
54. See Jones et at., supra note 2, at v ("What seems to exist at the present time is, in the first place,
what one might describe as the national legal system. It contains elementsrof the imperial system in that
it is essentially the legal system of a centralized bureaucracy.").
55. See generally Jones et al., supra note 2, at 9 ("Consequently the imperial law took note of
human activity only as it was perceived to affect imperial policies. It was natural that the primary focus
of attention would be the activities of bureaucrats in the performance of their duties, not the activities of
ordinary human beings in their private lives.").
56. See Sobel & Zhang, supra note 1, at 188 ("[Tlhe laws in China are promulgated by... the
National People's Congress and [more importantly] its Standing Committee.... [Most importantly t]he
State Council, a central governmental bureau, can enact detailed regulations to implement the relevant
foreign investment laws adopted in the National People's Congress.").
57. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 174-82.
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what would be called civil matters today.58 Formal Chirlese law in the early
codes reflects this view. 9 Most of these codes focused on punishment for
administrative breaches of bureaucratic procedure or for conduct considered
disruptive of social order.60 The codes touched on civil law matters primarily
only when relevant to tax collection.6
One area in which the central government retains direct or indirect control
over civil life is in that of civil disputes.62 One reason for this control is that
the Chinese courts have always been a functional arm of the Chinese
bureaucracy, 63 a bureaucracy possessing no apparent concept of "checks and
balances" or "separation of powers."
64
One of the major criticisms of the present Chinese court system is that its
decisionmaking processes are not insulated from political influence and, in
fact, may be subject to direct political and economic influences. 6
Most civil disputes in traditional China were not handled by the courts but
by town leaders, clan leaders, or guilds. 66 Likewise, at present, most civil
disputes are handled through such channels as mediation committees.67 It is
clear that even such "informal" dispute resolution mechanisms have not been
58. Jones et al., supra note 2. at 9; see also William C. Jones, Reflections on the Modern Chinese
Legal System (Commentary on China's Developing Labor Law), 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 1221, 1226 (1982)
("[Tihe state took little interest in large areas of society, notably the areas of contract and commercial law:
sales, loans, and banking. These areas could be regulated, and were if any state interest became
involved."); Jones et al., supra note 2, at 10 ("'Law' was concernied with enforcement of government
policy.").
59. See JAMIESON, supra note 15.
60. See JAMiEsoN, supra note 15; Jones et al., supra note 2, at 10 ("[O]ver half the [Ching] Code
is devoted to the regulation of the official activities of government officials.").
61. See Jones et al., supra note 58, at 12-16.
62. This is truest for larger and more complicated civil disputes because at the lowest level the
magistrate sits at the county or district level (jurisdictions encompassing more than 100,000 people).
Jurisdictions at higher levels encompass even more people. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 205. Continued
central government control over civil disputes is consistent with the central government's traditional
concern with conduct considered disruptive of social order. See Yu, supra note 17.
63. This is clearly true in criminal cases where the court's function is merely to try cases. Criminal
cases that reach the courts are actually decided before they are ever tried. See Jones et al., supra note 2,
at 41-42.
64. Because of this deficiency, the outcomes of decisions are likely to be influenced or even dictated
by the judge's superiors. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 229-30. The judge's official role has always
been to promote the policies of the central government. As Jones states:
The Chinese courts were also very conscious of the possible implications for society of
particular behavior .... In other words, the work of the court was an aspect of the work of
government in achieving its purposes .... [T~he court [was not] in any sense a neutral
adjudicator. It was very much a part of the process. The judges were government officials who
carried out its policies.
Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., Carl Goldstein, China Develops Business Law by Looking to Guangdong, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Nov. 1993, at 71, 72 ("[Wlho occupied the judge's chair mattered little more than any other
menial role in the judicial system: all simply followed party orders. Major judicial decisions were (and
are) taken in closed party cell meetings, not in open court.").
66. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 201.
67. Because this situation exists, the Chinese Communist Party is likely to have some influence on
the outcome of civil disputes. See Lubman, supra note ?, at 224, 226 ("[In 1980], depending on the
specific locale, the number of disputes resolved through mediation was greater than the number of cases
heard through the judicial system by a factor of five to several ten-fold."). The use of mediation as well
as arbitration reflects "the Chinese cultural preference for resolving disputes in a non-confrontational
manner." Sobel & Zhang, supra note 1, at 212.
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free from government influence because, in recent times, the Chinese
Communist Party has directly organized and overseen mediation committees
as tools of social control.
68
2. Maoist Influences
This subsection is intended only to point out the existence of certain
Maoist elements in the Chinese legal system, especially in relation to the
importance of policy. Although a detailed analysis would be intriguing and
insightful, it is impossible here. The Chinese legal system clearly retains
significant elements of socialism, including strong emphases on social and
economic planning.69
The central actor in this model is the. Chinese Communist Party ("CCP"),
which has maintained strict control of most elements of Chinese society,
including the functioning of the legal system. The CCP continues to promote
its policies through such quintessentially Maoist techniques as mass
campaigns, criticism meetings, propaganda, and staged trials.70 Although its
political power appears to be waning, and its ideological underpinnings
weakening, the CCP maintains significant and pervasive organizational control
of the Chinese government bureaucracy and state industry at all levels. 7'
Once again, this analysis points out the importance of policy in China's legal
system.
III. CREATING SECURITY IN CHINA
This section discusses the extent to which security is recognized in
published Chinese rules and regulations and then examines in detail the
functional aspects of taking security. The practices of creating security in
China, which must be distinguished from enforcing security, resemble
practices in the United States ever more closely. Both foreign and domestic
lenders have been entering into security arrangements in China for some
time. These security arrangements have included very advanced
68. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 226 ("Once again, mediation has been mustered into the service
of economic discipline.").
69. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 29-37 (detailing Maoist foundations of Chinese law); see also
Sobel & Zhang, supra note 1, at 186 ("The current legal system of the People's Republic of China has
evolved from a foundation of traditional Chinese values tempered by a heady dose of Maoist and Marxist
philosophy.").
70. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 37-46, 170-73 ("The campaign (yon dong) is essentially a mass
technique designed.to achieve political ends, which may be anything from eradicating flies to eliminating
spiritual corruption. Staged by the CCP, campaigns include heavy propaganda and 'criticism meetings'
from the local level to the top levels of government."); see also Lubman, supra note 11, at 202 ("Peer
group pressure was used to augment scarce governmental resources in punishing and deterring violators
of social order.").
71. See generally Jones et al., supra note 2, at 66-73 (discussing power of CCP and other Chinese
political institutions).
72. See Sobel & Zhang, supra note 1, at 193 ("The first widely used method for collateralizing
foreign loans in China was project finance .... [which] has its roots in the aftermath of the mid-1970s
oil crisis and recession."); Graham Morrison, Taking Security: An Introduction, in ASIA LAW AND
PRACTICE, TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA 1, 1 (Graham Morrison et al. eds., 1993)
("[Slecurity interests in the nature of mortgages or charges have frequently been granted in favor of
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practices.73 After first mentioning published laws and regulations recognizing
security in China, this section proceeds to examine functional factors
distinguishing the process of taking security in China from that in the United
States.
A. Published Laws and Regulations Setting Forth Security
As an initial matter, it is interesting and helpful to note the extent to
which the concept of security is set forth in published Chinese laws and
regulations.74 Clearly, the Chinese authorities both at the central level and
in the localities have been interested in security for some time now.' The
Civil Code,76 which was intended as the foundation for the new Chinese civil
law legislation,77 contains several provisions relating to security.78 Other
national legislation recognizing the concept of security should be noted as
foreign [and] domestic lenders since the early days of international financing transactions with PRC
borrowers. But only recently have more detailed regulations emerged which provide a concrete legal
framework for this practice."); see also Interview with Su Yigong, Chinese Doctor of Laws of the Institute
of Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, in St. Louis, Mo. (May 13, 1994). It is also true,
however, that taking security is not a brand new phenomenon in China. There is historical evidence of
fairly complex secured transactions going back before the Qing and Ming Dynasties and even from the
Sung Dynasty, over 1000 years ago.
73. Interview with Zheng Shujun, Chinese lawyer with C & C Law Office, Beijing, in Hong Kong
(July 19, 1994) [hereinafter Zheng Interview (July 19, 1994)]. This experienced Chinese lawyer indicated
that upper level Chinese courts are aware of such practices as taking floating charges over inventories, and
are inching toward officially recognizing them. She had recently spoken with one of the more influential
members of the Supreme People's Court who told her that although he would personally oppose floating
charges at present - on the grounds that such a practice was too advanced for China - other members
of the Court would not.
74. See Oechsli, supra note 3, at 26 ("Chinese laws, which, while not comprehensive, offer useful
guidance as to the permissible scope and practical implementation of such contractually created rights and
remedies.").
75. I am using the term "security interests" generally rather than specifically to identify transactions
involving personal (movable) property.
76. General Provisions of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (Apr. 12, 1986) (effective
Jan. 1, 1987), translated in William C. Jones, A Translation of the General Provisions of CivilLaw of the
People's Republic of China, 13 REv. SOcIALIST L. 357, 377-78 (1987) [hereinafter Civil Code].
77. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 217.
78. Some of these provisions are:
The following kinds of guarantees of performance of obligations may be selected in
accordance with the provisions of law or the agreement of the parties:
1) [This provision relates to guarantees which, strictly speaking, are not considered
security];
2) The obligor or a third party may tender designated property as collateral. If the
obligor does not perform the obligation, the obligee has a priority right to obtain compensation
according to the provisions of the law from the value of the collateral converted into money
or out of the proceeds received from selling off the collateral;
3) One party may give the other party a deposit within the scope provided by law. After
the obligor performs, the deposit will either be deducted from the price or returned. When the
party that has given the deposit does not perform the ob ligation, he has no right to demand
the return of the deposit. When the one receiving the deposit does not perform, he must return
double the deposit;
4) When, according to the contract, one party occupies the other's property and the
other party does not pay the agreed-upon sum within the time agreed upon, the party in
possession has a lien on the said property, and, according to the provisions of law, has a
priority right to be compensated out of the value of the liened property converted into money
or out of the amount received when the liened property is sold off.
General Civil Law, supra note 76, art. 89.
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well, including several "opinions" issued by the Supreme People's Court.79
The recent issuance of a national security law by the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress"0 has elevated the status of security in China
considerably.
Before enactment of the national security law, authorities in some of the
more economically progressive provinces, special economic zones, and cities
had already issued secured transactions regulations."1 Some of these localities
have included, among others, Guangdong Province, Fujian Province,
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, Tianjin Special Economic Zone,
Guangzhou, Beijing, and Shanghai. Until the national security law was
enacted, local regulations dealing with security were much more detailed than
national laws. It appears clear from the published regulations that the more
progressive developments in Chinese secured transactions law were tried first
in regional and municipal mortgage regulation."2
B. Security Law in Practice
This section focuses on actual practices involved in creating a security
interest in China. The focus is on function as opposed to form. The discussion
proceeds from practices involved in the creation of a security interest to the
79. See, e.g., Opinion of July 14, 1992 (Civil Procedure Law), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme
People's Court], reprinted and translated in TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURrrY IN CHINA, supra note 72,
at 89, 89, art. 241; Opinion of Nov. 7, 1991 (Enterprise Insolvency Law (Trial Implementation)), Zuigao
Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], reprinted and translated in TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY
IN CHINA, supra note 72, at 110, 111, art. 4(3); Opinion of Aug. 13, 1991 (Handling of Loan Cases by
People's Courts), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], reprinted and translated in TAKING
AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA, supra note 72, at 123, 126, art. 18; Opinion of Jan. 26, 1988 (Civil
Law General Principles), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court] [hereinafter Opinion (Civil
Law General Principles)], reprinted and translated in TAKING AND ENFORCING SECuRrrY IN CHINA, supra
note 72, at 84, 86, art. 115; Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China 19-201, 7th Nat'l
People's Cong., 4th Sess. (Apr. 9, 1991) [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law], reprinted in CHINA LAWS
FOR FOR. Bus. (1992); State Enterprise Insolvency Law (for Trial Implementation) (1986) [hereinafter
State Enterprise Insolvency Law] (a peculiarity of the Chinese legal system is the role of the Supreme
People's Court as a legislative body; instead of being limited to a judicial role as we are accustomed in
the United States, the Supreme People's Court routinely issues pronouncements in legislative form).
80. Security Law, supra note 4.
81. See, e.g., Beijing Municipality Measures for the Administration of Real Estate Mortgages (Apr.
20, 1994); Liquidation of Foreign Investment Enterprise Procedures, Beijing Municipality (June 1, 1992),
reprinted and translated in TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA, supra note 72, at 127; Secured
Loans Circular, Dongguan Municipality (Aug. 28, 1992), reprinted and translated in TAKING AND
ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA, supra note 72, at 32; Secured Loan Regulations, Fujian Province (May
1, 1991) [hereinafter Fujian Secured Loansl, reprinted and translated in TAKING AND ENFORCING
SECURITY IN CHINA, supra note 72, at 44; Administration of Secured Loan Regulations, Guangdong
Province (Dec. 20, 1992) [hereinafter Guangdong Secured Loans], reprinted and translated in TAKING
AND ENFORCING SECURrrY IN CHINA, supra note 72, at 3; Administration of Real Property Mortgage
Procedures, Guangzhou Municipality (June 6, 1990) [hereinafter Guangzhou Property Mortgages],
reprinted and translated in TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA, supra note 72, at 11; Shanghai
Municipality Regulations for the Liquidation of Foreign Investment Enterprises (Aug. 16, 1991) (effective
Oct. 1, 1991); Provisional Regulations of Renminbi Loan Administration, Shanghai Municipality (June
9, 1988) [hereinafter Shanghai Mortgage Loans], reprinted and translated in TAKING AND ENFORCING
SECURITY IN CHINA, supra note 72, at 127; Administration for Real Property Mortgage Loan Procedures,
Tianjin Economic and Technical Development Zone (1991) [hereinafter Tianjin Mortgage Loan
Procedures], reprinted and translated in TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA, supra note 72,
at 35.
82. See Clifford Chance, supra note 45; see also Oechsli, supra note 3, at 1.
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functional purposes served by creating security. The primary focus is on
Chinese practices as compared with practices in the United States.
1. Creating a Security Interest
This section discusses what distinguishes the process of creating a security
interest in China from that in the United States. Both Chinese and U.S. law
usually require a writing in order to create a valid security interest. In the
United States, this requirement is specific to the creation of a security
interest.83 In China, however, the requirement is common to all "economic
contracts,"8 4 not just to security agreements."5 In this regard, however, the
writing requirement may sometimes be softened to a greater extent in
China.86 As a purely practical matter, Chinese and U.S. practices do not
greatly differ; the differences are essentially matters of legal form.
There are other minor and location-specific formalities that should be
carefully observed in China. For example, as in some states in the United
States, land mortgages generally must be signed by a local notary. It is also
a prudent practice to have the mortgagor stamp the mortgage document with
its official stamp in addition to having the mortgagor's legal representative
sign the document.8 7 Beyond such contractual and formal legal elements,
several important functional factors distinguish the process in China from that
in the United States.
a. Mandatory Registration88
This section discusses one of the most important ways in which the taking
of security in China differs from that in the United States: mandatory
83. U.C.C. § 9-203(1),(2) (1994).
84. See Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, 5th Nat'l People's Cong., 4th
Sess. 5-500(2) (Dec. 13, 1981), reprinted in CCH Austi. Ltd. at 6551 (June 28, 1988) (defining rights
and duties of parties for purpose of realizing economic goals). This description should be understood to
include security agreements.
85. Id. art. 3 ("Economic contracts should be in written form, except when they are fulfilled
immediately."); Opinion of Oct. 19, 1987 (Application of Foreign Economic Contract Law), Zuigao
Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court] § 3(v), 5-555, reprinted in CCH Austl. Ltd. at 6641 (June
28, 1988).
86. The Supreme People's Court has stated that:
[w]hen a debtor or a third party provides security to a creditor, a written contract shall be
established or the matter shall be clearly explained in the original debt document. Where there
is no written contract, but there is other proof to certify the security, or the certificate of rights
to such security has been given to the mortgagee, a security relationship may be regarded as
established.
Opinion (Civil Law General Principles), supra note 79, art. 112.
87. Wang Wai Li, Security in the Law?, I CHiNA L.J. 8, 12 (1993).
88. The term "registration" (dengli) has two meanings in China: (1) the government validation
necessary to create an enforceable security interest, and (2) as in the United States, filing a record to
perfect a security interest. I have used the term "mandatory registration" and "optional registration"
respectively to distinguish these concepts which as a matter of procedure are essentially the same.
There is some confusion about the terms used in the Chinese regulations. In at least one instance,
a regulation seems to distinguish between dengii (registration), belan (recording), and gaozhl (giving
notice). See, e.g., Beijing Municipality Measures for the Administration of Real Estate Mortgages arts.
8-11 (Apr. 20, 1994). In this regulation, all three of these are required to create a valid security interest,
as is the tongyi (consent) of interested parties.
1996] Taking Security in China
registration. Registration is mandatory in certain circumstances in China even
to create a security interest."g In the United States, filing, which may
reasonably be equated with Chinese registration as a matter of procedure, is
generally necessary only to perfect a security interest and is not mandatory.
Registration is mandatory - not optional - in numerous settings. In
some localities, failure to register invalidates the entire transaction and the
heretofore secured party suddenly becomes unsecured.9" This may happen
up to thirty days after the security agreement has been executed and
sometimes longer. Registration is mandatory for real estate mortgages and
properties originally subject to property registration. Registration is also
mandatory for patents, trademarks, and guarantees. 9 In the case of
mortgages over land use rights, failure to register results in invalidity and the
inability. to enforce the mortgage.92 Buildings and fixtures are normally
mortgaged together with the underlying land use rights.93 Mortgages over
shares in a company or over an equity share in an enterprise wholly owned
by a foreign investor must be registered with- the relevant authority.94
The practice of requiring registration for the creation of a valid security
interest is strikingly different from U.S. practice and is a good illustration of
the Chinese tendency to assert governmental supervisory authority in civil
matters. Other related requirements also appear onerous compared with the
United States. Document submission requirements for mandatory registration
can be quite detailed.9' Generally speaking, registration must occur within
thirty days of execution of the mortgage contract, as compared with sixty days
89. For instance, Morrison discusses registration in the context of mortgages:
The regulations generally require the registration of mortgages, but different procedures are
specified in relation to mortgages over different types of asset[s] .... In addition to the
mortgage regulations which apply in the relevant location, it may be necessary to refer to
certain other PRC laws and regulations .... This will depend on the nature of the mortgagor.
For example, the Detailed Implementing Rules of the [PRC] on Wholly Foreign Owned
Enterprises contain a requirement for approval from the relevant government authority for
mortgages to be created by wholly foreign owned enterprises.
Morrison, supra note 72, at 2.
90. See, e.g., Beijing Municipality Measures for the Administration of Real Estate Mortgages art.
35 (Apr. 20, 1994) ("For real estate mortgages for which registration is not handled with the registration
department, the mortgage is invalid .... ").
91. Wang, supra note 87, at 12. "[Pjroperties which are originally subject to registration" can cover
quite a range of possible properties in China. Id.
92. See David Dall Liu & Mark Reed. Taking and Enforcing Security in the People's Republic of
China 5 (Jan. 1, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
93. Id. at 6. Nevertheless, in practice these should be registered with a different authority.
Registration of land use rights is normally with the Land Administration. However, buildings and fixtures
should normally be registered with the Real Estate Authority. The two authorities are distinct government
entities in China. Id.
94. Id. In Shanghai, the relevant authority is the State Administration of Exchange Control (SAEC).
In Guangdong, it is the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC). ,
95. See, e.g., Fujian Secured Loans, supra note 81, art. 30. This law states:
When parties to a secured loan contract handle secured loan registration, the following
documents must be submitted to the registration authority: (1) the registration application; (2)
the secured loan contract; (3) proof of ownership of or proof of usage rights to the property
securing the loan; and (4) certification of examination and approval by the relevant department
or the consent of other parties regarding the establishment of the security, as required by the
Regulations.
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in other countries where registration of security interests is mandatory. 96
In practice, registration may not always be necessary for the creation of
a valid security interest.97 This may be true even in localities with
regulations declaring that such a deficiency invalidates the transaction.98
Certain Chinese lawyers believe that registration serves purely as the basis for
"priority" and the enforcement of security interests against third party
mortgagees. 99 As Professor Jones has stated, what Chinese lawyers think the
law means may have significance in and of itself.'" Regardless of what the
paper law says, China's law in action is a function of such factors.
b. Third Party Consent
This section discusses an additional important way in which the Chinese
process of creating security differs from that in the United States, i.e., the
legal requirement that the debtor obtain the approval of interested third
parties. This requirement creates an additional burden when viewed from a
U.S. perspective. However, from a Chinese perspective, the requirement
serves the dual purposes of avoiding inappropriate transfers of property and,
more basically, avoiding disputes between interested parties.
In the United States, parties enter security agreements at will by private
contract. There is generally no legal requirement for the creation of a valid
security agreement that a debtor obtain approval from any third party. This
is true even if such approval is required by the security agreement between
the parties.' 0 ' However, in China, generally speaking, before the parties can
legally create a security interest they must obtain the approval of any third
party that has a property interest in the security (or anyone with a
"regulatory" or "administrative" interest in the transaction)."ea In some
instances, notification is sufficient and the third party's approval is
96. Kevin Ching, Address at the Debt Recovery in China Seminar (Feb. 19, 1992) (outline available
in library of Clifford Chance, Hong Kong).
97. Interview with Chen Jianlong, Chinese lawyer with C & C Law Office, Beijing, in Hong Kong
(July 9, 1994) [hereinafter Chen Interview (July 9, 1994)1.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See generally Jones et al., supra note 2, at 166-217 (discussing development of Chinese civil
law).
101. See U.C.C. § 9-311 (1994) ("The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or
involuntarily transferred (by way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, garnishment or
other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement prohibiting any transfer or
making the transfer constitute a default." (emphasis added)). Thus, in the United States, the ability to
dispose of one's property (or to create a security interest in it) is valued even over contractual obligations.
102. This is the case when the property over which the security interest is to be granted is jointly
owned by the mortgagor and one or more persons. In this case, the written consent of all joint owners
must be obtained. When the prospective mortgagor is a joint venture or shareholding enterprise, it is
necessary to obtain approval of the board of directors by board resolution. This is also true for leased
property, although, in addition, the Fujian regulations require the mortgagor to enter into a written
undertaking with the lessee as to the performance of the secured loan contract. Where there are several
mortgagees, consent of each of the mortgagees must be obtained prior to mortgaging again. In the case
of real estate mortgages in which the prospective mortgagee is outside of China, prospective non-joint
venture mortgagors must apply to the foreign exchange authorities for approval. Joint ventures need only
notify the authorities.
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unnecessary. 3 Significantly, all local Chinese regulations enacted to date
require the approval of the first mortgagee before additional mortgages may
be created in the mortgaged property.'04
Despite the paper requirements," 5 in practice domestic Chinese
parties generally do not obtain approvals."° There are a number of possible
reasons for this. The parties may believe that approvals are extraneous and
bothersome and may prefer to avoid the bureaucracy. They may simply be
unaware of the paper requirements which are commonly understood as
primarily for the benefit of foreigners. When aware of paper requirements,
parties may feel that they have sufficient power relative to other interested
parties such that they can successfully get away with violating the paper law.
Not to be overlooked, parties may simply be lazy. Whatever the reasons may
be in a given case, the Chinese practice clearly exemplifies the gap between
China's paper civil law and actual commercial practice.
The practical implications of requiring registration and approvals involve
the difficulties associated with locating interested parties, obtaining their
approvals, locating appropriate government departments, and obtaining access
to appropriate officials. As in the United States, although to a greater degree,
none of these tasks is easy in the Chinese legal system. Interested parties may
be difficult or impossible to find, and once found may prove unwilling to give
approval. Locating appropriate government departments can be a daunting
experience to the uninitiated, especially when multiple government
departments have a connection to the transaction. Obtaining access to
appropriate government bureaucrats can also be an extremely frustrating and
time consuming experience. The practical implications of requiring
registration and approvals thus involve the systemic difficulties that presently
exist in the developing Chinese legal system.
As a related matter, problems sometimes arise in relation to Chinese or
other parties (official and unofficial) who are not so concerned with observing
the formalities of Chinese paper law. In negotiation, Chinese parties
sometimes will state (correctly or incorrectly) that they are restricted from a
particular course by Chinese law or by neibu, or internal, restrictions. Often,
however, this is no more than a preferred negotiation position. 7 Foreign
parties are presented with a choice whether to follow formal legal
103. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 87, at 10. This is the case when each of the joint owners owns a
distinct part of the security. Then the prospective mortgagor only needs to give 30 days prior written
notification to the other co-owners.
104. Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 10.
105. Use of the term "paper law" or "paper requirements" is meant to convey the sense that what
is written in published Chinese rules and regulations is often not reflective of actual practice, or the law
in fact. This usage is similar to that in Pound, supra note 25 (law in action versus law in books); see also
Jones, Questions, supra note 14, at 331 (use of term "real legal system" distinguishing law in fact from
newly enacted legislation).
106. Interview with Chen Jianlong, Chinese lawyer with C & C Law Office, Beijing, in Hong Kong
(July 7, 1994) [hereinafter Chen Interview (July 7, 1994)]. It seems that even when they have been aware
of legal requirements, Chinese parties have sometimes ignored the details. There is a feeling that the
substance of the transaction is sufficient to be enforceable, that the parties can work out the details as a
project progresses, or that even if there is a legal flaw, another party will be unable to obtain or enforce
a judgment.
107. Interview with Stuart Valentine, Lawyer with Clifford Chance, Hong Kong, in Hong Kong
(Nov. 6, 1995) (thirteen years of experience negotiating with Chinese parties).
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requirements or commercial expediencies. Aside from the ethical dilemmas
presented (foreign parties may play an important role in the development of
commercial practices in China, including respect for the rule of law), the
choice to yield to commercial expediencies may also subject foreign parties
to unreasonable commercial risk (including the risk that heretofore cooperative
government officials may suddenly decide to apply the written rules).
Even with an understanding of commercial practice, it is still advisable
to obtain approvals, as failure to do so will result in an invalid and perhaps
unenforceable security interest under Chinese paper law. '' Security taken
by foreign enterprises in China should always be approved by the appropriate
investment authorities as well as the State Administration of Industry and
Commerce."' Security taken over land use rights should be approved by the
State Land Bureau."' Until commercial practices come to mirror the paper
law, or vice versa, those taking security in China should follow the paper law.
Foreigners can deal with pressure to bend the rules by clearly understanding
Chinese rules of law before engaging in important negotiations and by holding
firm in the face of pressure to bend the rules.
c. Prdperty Issues
This section highlights the importance of determining what property may
be the subject of a security interest in China as compared with the United
States. Determining what property may legally be made the subject of a
security interest is not an exceedingly important issue in the United States.
The situation is very different in China, where, although many types of
property may now be charged or mortgaged,"' many others are partially or
absolutely restricted and may not be made the subject of a security interest at
all."
2
A number of complexities exist in this area that may surprise the
unwary."' This is especially true in the case of land, which is theoretically
108. See Wang, supra note 87, at 10-11.
109. See Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 7.
110. Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 5-6.
111. Barbara Mok, Victor Chu & Co., Hong Kong, Speech at China Law and Practice Seminar
"Taking and Enforcing Security in China" (Nov. 25, 1993) (transcript outline available in Clifford Chance
library in Hong Kong) (properties that may presently be mortgaged or in which a valid security interest
may legally be created include: "land use rights, including superstructures; other tangible assets such as
machinery and equipment, raw materials, semi-finished and end products, motor vehicles and
vessels[;] ... intellectual property rights including patents [and] trademarks ... [;] shares and other
transferable rights and interests").
112., Id. Restricted properties include:
land[;] land use rights for which compensation to the State has not been paid and [for which]
the prescribed transfer process has not been completed[;] natural resources and assets the
trading of which is prohibited by law[;] assets the ownership of which is in disputef;l assets
which have been confiscated pursuant to judicial process[; and] public welfare facilities[,]
e.g.[,] schools [and] hospitals.
Id.
113. It is important to note that only land use rights that were originally granted for valuable
consideration may be~mortgaged. Land use rights allocated by the Chinese government without the
payment of a land use premium may not subsequently be mortgaged unless a land use fee is paid and a
transfer contract executed. See, e.g., Law of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Real
Estate in Mainland Cities and Municipalities, 8th Nat'l People's Cong., 8th Sess. art. 50 (1994) (effective
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impossible to transfer or mortgage because it is owned by the "whole
people."" 4 The Chinese authorities have gotten around this difficulty by
permitting long term leases on "land use rights," which may be
mortgaged."' Buildings that have not yet been constructed, known as
"pre-sold real property," may be mortgaged as security."6 In practice,
Chinese parties may now mortgage essentially every type of property they can
"own" - a highly loaded and restricted term in the Chinese context - and
they do.
117
In China, close attention should be paid to the rules and accepted
practices relative to particular types of property. Presently, the assignment of
contractual rights as security is allowed under the Foreign Economic Contract
Law, subject to the approval of other contracting parties and the original
approving authority."' Contractual rights that may be assigned and that have
been assigned in practice include interests in construction contracts; bonds,
guarantees, sales contracts, accounts, insurance, licenses, deposit receipts,
shares, patents, trademarks, and copyrights." 9 The mortgage of a joint
venture partner's share in the registered capital of a joint venture is also
permissible. 2° Less clear, although apparently possible in practice, is the
ability to take security in inventories and the proceeds of inventories.''
Although it is legally possible to take security in the stock of a company,"
in practice such security is rarely taken."
Jan. 1, 1995).
114. See generally Sobel & Zhang, supra note 1, at 203-10. Ownership of land and other property
in China has a varied history. In 1953, Mao Zedong took land from landlords and redistributed the land
in equal shares to peasants. Two years later, land was taken from individuals and turned over to
collectives. Land came to be owned by the whole people. Due to the influence of socialism, which
continues today, it is politically impossible to transfer a "fee simple" interest in land to nonstate entities
or individuals.
115. Depending on the nature of land use, land use rights may be granted for periods of up to 70
years. See Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China concerning the Grant and Assignment
of Land Use Rights to State Land in Urban Areas, State Council ch. II, art. 12 (May 24, 1990).
116. See Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 6. However, the use of pre-sold real property for security
is "subject to the mortgagor completing its obligations under the pre-sale agreement." Id.
117. Interview with Chen Jianlong, Chinese lawyer with C & C Law Office, Beijing, in Hong Kong
(July 14, 1994). It is true, of course, that not all types of property may be privately owned.
118. See Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (Dec. 13, 1981).
119. See, e.g., Mok, supra note 111, at 1; see also, e.g., Elizabeth Owen, Enforcing Security in
China: Law and Practice, in TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA, supra note 72, at 71, 73.
120. Owen, supra note 119, at 73; see also Wang, supra note 87, at 10-11 ("If the shareholder of
such an enterprise wishes to create security over its shareholding, it will ,have to obtain the written
consents of the other shareholders and the approval of the board of directors.") Approval of the original
approval authority is also necessary. Id.
121. The practice known in some circles as "floating charges" has been utilized in several projects
throughout China, particularly in localities without any secured transactions legislation. See Zheng
Interview (July 19, 1994), supra note 73. But see Liu & Reed, supra note 92,at 8 ("However, such an
agreement would need to be drafted very carefully because, under existing local security legislation, if a
mortgagor disposes of the mortgaged property without the consent of the foreign mortgagee, such disposal
would be void.").
122. See Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 8-9.
123. See Still no Champaign for Panco, AsIAMONEY, Nov. 1993, at 31. This is perhaps for a good
reason. In December of 1992, the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court declared that a share transaction
that had been fully authorized two years earlier was illegal. Champaign's majority shareholder, Panco, had
secured six bank loans by mortgaging shares in Champaign listed on the Shenzhen and 'Shanghai stock'
exchanges. The mortgages had been fully approved, mortgage contracts executed,-ublic notices published,
mortgages registered, and the shares placed in the possession of the lender. The Shenzhen Intermediate
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2. Giving Notice to Third Parties
This section illustrates the extent to which such processes as placing
security interests on record in a public register or taking physical possession
of collateral serve similar purposes in China as in the United States. In the
United States, an important purpose of filing is to place a record in a filing
system where third parties can find it. 24 Physical possession can also serve
such a notice function by alerting third parties that the collateral is secured.
Notice to third parties serves as a rational basis for enforcement against them,
and, thus, the legal effect of filing and physical possession in the United
States is perfection, which serves as the legal basis for enforcement against
third parties. 5 Unfortunately, as discussed below, the filing system does
not perform the notice function very well either in the United States t26 or
in China, and physical possession of collateral in China may not have a notice
function at all. In fact, a notice function may only be beginning to emerge in
China.
Filing in the United States is not necessary for creating a valid security
interest; it is only necessary for perfecting an already valid security interest.
In several Chinese localities registration is likewise necessary only for
perfection - to make the security interest enforceable against third
parties. 7 In these localities, failure to register does not invalidate the
security interest; as in the United States, the still valid security interest is
simply not perfected.' Hereinafter, I have termed this kind of registration
"optional registration."
The different legal effects of registration are interesting, as they seem to
reflect a certain ambivalence in China between views favoring market based
Western approaches to secured transactions (and civil and commercial law in
general) and views favoring holding to a system that reserves an important
People's Court determined that the security was illegal and confiscated the shares. On appeal, the
Guangdong Higher People's Court reversed the Shenzhen court's ruling, but the shares were never
returned.
The true basis for the ruling may have been an upward valuation of Champaign's shares of Rmb
27.5 million and a subsequent distribution of the valuation gain to shareholders. A State company, Xinye,
was one of the shareholders that had, one month prior to the revaluation, converted its shares into
"non-preference" shares, which in effect capped its dividends. Panco made a windfall gain of Rmb 24.6
million on the revaluation, dwarfing Xinye's Rmb 400,000. The restructuring committee set up by the
Shenzhen People's Government reported that "it]his action of revaluation followed by distribution of the
excess resulted in an injury to the State." Id.
124. Lynn M. LoPucki, Coiputerization of the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on Building the
Electronic Highway, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (1992) ("An important purpose of the [article 9
filing] system is to communicate the existence of filed financing statements to those who search the
records. If a filing was made, a searcher should be able to find [it].").
125. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1994); see also LYNN M. LoPUcKi & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED
CREDIT: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS ch. 23 (forthcoming May 1995).
126. LoPucKi & WARREN, supra note 125, ch 19.
127. See, e.g., Fujian Provincial Secured Loan Regulations, art. 29 (May 1, 1991) ("When property
that is required to be registered has not been registered, a bonafide third party may not be opposed.").
Thus, it appears from the text that failure to register does not affect the validity of the transaction itself
but only enforcement against third parties. This matches the filing requirement for perfection in the United
States.
128. This may be the case because the paper law does not require it. See infra Part lll.B.2.a. This
may also be the case because local practice does not require it. See supra note 144.
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and pervasive (and some would say an intrusive and hindering) role for
government control over private commercial activity. 29 Such issues may
have been responsible for the lengthy delay in promulgation of the long
awaited National Security Law, a draft of which was in circulation at the time
this Article was first conceived and written. 3'
a. Optional Registration
This section illustrates how the Chinese system of secured transactions
continually more closely resembles U.S. practices. As discussed above,
recording a security interest on a public record may be mandatory for creating
a valid security interest. The same process is necessary for perfecting a
security interest and making it enforceable against third parties. With the
exception of security interests requiring mandatory registration, perfection of
security interests is optional. This Article adopts the terms mandatory
registration and optional registration to distinguish the two concepts.13' The
reader should remember, that in either case, mandatory or optional
registration perfects the security interest.
A difficulty has arisen as to the proper treatment of security interests in
property for which registration is optional, not mandatory. How does one
register in order to perfect? Some localities are dealing with this problem by
creating general recording bureaus for the registration of all security
interests. 13' This would seem to be the logical answer. As a matter of
current practice, however, even in localities with such bureaus, people
generally do not register. 3 Whereas filing remains the most important
means of perfecting security interests in the United States, this is not so in
China. In China, as in the United States, physical possession plays an
important function where people do not register.
(1) Place of Registration
This section reveals the distance (as well as growing similarities) between
Chinese and U.S. practices with respect to the filing of security interests.
129. If China were to move entirely to a nonadministrative model, the registration requirement would
be optional, as the filing requirement is in the United States. When this is the case, the only penalty for
not registering is an unperfected security interest and the inability to enforce the security interest against
some third parties. The United States itself does not have such a system, as filing is practically required
in real estate transactions to prevent the prior owner from transferring good title to another purchaser, who
could then avoid the transaction.
130. Chen Interview (July 9, 1994), supra note 97.
131. Again, some confusion is inherent in the terminology used in the Chinese regulations. The term
dengil used in the regulations is ambiguous because it refers both to the creation of a valid security interest
in what is referred to here as mandatory registration and to the perfection of a security interest in what
is here referred to as optional registration. This essential translational bifurcation highlights the different
legal effects and functional problems that are presently part of the Chinese system.
132. Interview with Chen Jianlong, Chinese lawyer with C & C Law Office, Beijing, in Hong Kong
(July 21, 1994). One such bureau is apparently located in Shanghai and may in fact be the registration
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Optional registration fulfills essentially the same function in China as it does
in the United States. Optional registration is not yet as commonplace in China
as filing is in the United States, and is clearly not yet as firmly entrenched in
practice.
Although in the United States a secured party technically needs to file in
only one location, depending on the nature of the collateral, he or she in
practice must often file in multiple locations to ensure that the security interest
will be perfected.'34 Filings for personal property take place in the office of
the Secretary of State or in the county Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
filings office.'35 Real estate filings occur in different locations. Filings are
often required in both state and county offices.'
The place of optional registration in China, likewise, depends on the
nature of the collateral. 37 As in the United States, optional registration may
occur in more than one location or government bureau, depending on the
locality and type of collateral being secured.' 38 Examples of relevant
authorities potentially include local offices of the State Administration of State
Assets, the State Administration of Exchange Control (SAEC), and multiple
land administration bureaus.
In the United States, there is a location for the filing and perfection of
almost any security interest in any kind of collateral. This is not true in China
where there has often been no place to record and perfect security interests
in certain kinds of collateral.'39 This is generally true where the collateral
is not property for which government regulations require mandatory
registration. 140
This important deficiency will be remedied by implementation of the long
anticipated national law governing secured transactions.' 4' Shanghai
Municipality has already taken steps in this direction by requiring the
registration of all security interests in real and personal property collateral for
foreign exchange and renminbi mortgages and by establishing a location for
the recording of all such security interests.
142
(2) Maintaining Registration
Filings in the Chinese registration system require less effort to maintain
134. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 125, ch. 19. Multiple filings are often necessary because
of uncertainty as to the proper place of filing.
135. LoPucKi & WARREN, supra note 125, ch. 19.
136. LOPUcKi & WARREN, supra note 125, ch. 19.
137. See Barry Cheng & C.Y. Leung, Legal and Practical Implications of the New PRC Security
Law, CHINA BANKING & FIN., Sept. 18, 1995, at 1, 5; [Law firm of] Allen & Overy, Security Interests
in the PRC 1 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
138. See Allen & Overy, supra note 137, at 1.
139. See Cheng & Leung, supra. note 137, at 6.
140, It is often the case that government regulations do not require mandatory registration for
personal property. But see sources cited supra notes 132, 137. Shanghai has for some time provided for
the filing of all security interests.
141. Chen Interview (July 9, 1994), supra note 97. A draft of this law was reportedly in circulation
at the time of the interview. See also Cheng & Leung, supra note 137, at 6.
142. Interview with Gao Peiji, Lawyer with Clifford Chance, Hong Kong, in Hong Kong (July 21,
1994) [hereinafter Gao Interview (July 21, 1994)].
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than they do in the United States. In the United States, a filing in the U.C.C.
personal property filing system must be updated every five years. 43 This
mechanism serves the purposes of cleansing the system of stale security
interests and, more importantly, of encouraging diligence on the part of
parties to secured transactions. In China, once registration of any security
interest has been accomplished, there is no need to update the recording.'
44
The registration expires only upon the expiration of the underlying security
interest.
145
(3) Searching the Register
This section indicates the difference between, and the common difficulties
experienced in, the Chinese and United States systems with respect to
searching for security interests. In many ways, the Chinese and U.S. systems
are widely divergent with respect to searching. Interested parties in the United
States can search the system at will (subject, perhaps, to cost constraints) in
the attempt to locate information on potentially encumbered property.1" In
some filing offices, searchers are even able to rummage through files
themselves.1 47
Although few Chinese regulations explicitly allow inspection of the
register,141 Chinese lawyers insist that in practice anyone can inquire about
specific pieces of property at the place of registration to see if they have
already been secured. 49 However, the same lawyers concede that in some
instances it may be necessary to have a lawyer, a public security official, or
another person with a special letter of introduction inquire at the place of
registration. 5 Only in the case of land administration bureaus is it clear that
a search may be performed.1 '
Title searches for government or state owned goods and property in China
are, in theory, not too problematic. Mortgages over such goods are subject to
the approval of the Administration for State Assets, and careful records are
supposedly kept on file by that authority.' Title searches for non-state
143. See LoPucKI & WARREN, supra note 125, ch. 24. As for security interests in real estate, once
filed, a filing need never be updated.
144. Chen Interview (July 9, 1994), supra note 97.
145. Gao Interview (July 21, 1994), supra note 142.
146. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 125, ch, 19.
147. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 125, ch. 19.
148. But see, e.g., Fujian Secured Loans, supra note 81, art. 33 ("Any natural person, legal person
or other organization may look up and make copies of the registration card, index and contract of the
security at the registration authority."); Regulations of the People's Republic of China for the Registration
of Vessels, State Council art. 22 (June 2, 1994) (effective Jan. 1, 1995) (stating that vessel registration
authority shall allow public to inquire about registration status of vessel mortgage rights).
149. Gao Interview (July 21, 1994), supra note 142; Chen Interview (July 9, 1994), supra note 97
(no regulations prohibit inspection).
150. Gao Interview (July 21, 1994), supra note 142; Chen Interview (July 9, 1994), supra note 97.
151. Owen, supra note 119, at4.
152. See Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 8 ("In practice this check is notvery difficult for goods
owned by state-owned enterprises, as the mortgage is subject to the approval of the Administration for
State Assets[;] the equipment and stock-in-trade list can be checked with that authority.").
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owned goods and property are another problem entirely. '53 As discussed
above, some types of such property are not subject to registration. 54 This
is typically the case for property termed personal property or chattels in the
United States.'55 Where government regulations do not require registration
of security interests, it may be next to impossible to discover the existence of
such an interest.' 56
Identifying particular property when searching a register can present an
additional overwhelming problem in China. This problem is not unique to
China; 57 however, it is not difficult to imagine the problems of identifying
secured property in China, where the ownership of property is unclear.'58
The easiest method of identifying particular property is obtaining the
registration number from the mortgagor. 59 Where this is not feasible, the
difficulties in discovering encumbrances on property will be largely of the
same type as those experienced in the United States, and perhaps more severe.
b. Possession
This section illustrates the gap between Chinese and United States
practices with respect to the purposes served by physical possession of the
secured property. Perfection may be accomplished in the United States
without filing, where the mortgagee takes possession of the property 60 or
otherwise by operation of law. Possession has similar legal significance in
China."" Where Chinese parties can take actual physical possession of the
collateral, there may be no necessity to register.
62
The actual physical possession of collateral in China, where enforcement
is notoriously difficult, may have fundamentally different purposes compared
with the United States. Instead of serving as the basis of perfection and
enforcement against third parties as it does in the United States,
63
possession may often simply serve the basic purpose in China of allowing a
mortgagee to enforce a mortgage contract against the mortgagor.'
64
Parties in China may enforce when they have taken collateral into their
possession at the inception of a contract, as in the case of certificates over
153. See Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 8 ("[Dlue to the difficulties in obtaining the necessary
information, taking security over the goods of non-state-owned business entities is not as
straightforward.").
154. See supra text accompanying note 97.
155. Interview with Chen Jianlong, Chinese lawyer with C & C Law Office, Beijing, in Hong Kong
(July 22, 1994).
156. Shanghai has made some movement in the direction of remedying this problem by the
development of a general registration office for foreign exchange and renminbi mortgages.
157. See generally LoPucki, supra note 124 (detailing failings of Article 9 filing system).
158. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 299-317.
159. Gao Interview (July 21, 1994), supra note 142.
160. U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1)(a), 9-305 (1994) (perfection may be accomplished according to this article
by taking possession of "letters of credit, goods, instruments (other than certificated securities), money,
negotiable documents or chattel paper" either by mortgagee or by agent of mortgagee).
161. Gao Interview (July 21, 1994), supra note 142.
162. Gao Interview (July 21, 1994), supra note 142.
163. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1994).
164. This assertion may be somewhat simplified. Actual physical possession in the United States also
serves this function in some respects.
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bank accounts, insurance contracts, performance bonds, or land use
rights. 65 Chinese courts have upheld self-enforcement where a mortgagee
retains the investment certificate to a joint venture. 166 Thus, although the
examples are far from extensive, possession in China appears to serve the
rudimentary functions of creation and enforcement at the most basic level
instead of notice and perfection as it does in the United States.
There are other mechanisms for providing notice in China in addition to
registration and physical possession. For example, it is possible to perfect in
China by posting an actual notice on each item of collateral. 67 In one
particular leasing case, the foreign party welded a notice stating the name of
the lessor of the equipment to give notice of the existence of a mortgage and
took photographs of the exact location of the welds in case these identification
markers were removed. 168 The ability to perfect in several different ways
illustrates a certain flexibility in the Chinese system with respect to giving
notice to third parties.
IV. ENFORCING SECURITY INTERESTS
This part analyzes the problem of enforcement functionally from the
perspective of processes designed to result in a remedy against debtors, third
parties, and the government. After all, a security agreement is little more than
paper if it is unenforceable. 69 The general consensus among non-Chinese
lawyers is that the "jury is still out" on the ability to enforce security
agreements in China. 7' Chinese lawyers appear to feel cautiously optimistic
that Chinese courts are increasingly likely to enforce security agreements.'
165. Interview with Zheng Shujun, Chinese lawyer with C & C Law Office, Beijing, in Hong Kong
(July 21, 1994) [hereinafter Zheng Interview (July 21, 1994)]. According to Zheng, retaining possession
of the collateral allows the mortgagee to exert leverage otherwise impossible. The mortgagee may retain
the land use rights certificate, and transfer of ownership may be impossible without the cooperation of the
mortgagor. The transfer of ownership in land use rights requires approval by several administrative
bureaus, a change of registration, and even the payment of a land use fee. It is unlikely that a mortgagee
could perform this unilaterally. Therefore, it is important to include such contingencies in the mortgage
agreement.
166. Interview with Gao Peiji, Lawyer with Clifford Chance, Hong Kong, in Hong Kong (July 13,
1994) [hereinafter Gao Interview (July 13, 1994)].
167. Id.
168. Interview with John Kuzmick, Lawyer with White & Case, Hong Kong, in Hong Kong (July
26, 1994).
169. Indeed, Roscoe Pound argued that "[tihe life of the law is in its enforcement." Roscoe Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 619 (1908). It is of course true that a security or
mortgage agreement, even if unenforceable, may provide some level of comfort and a modicum of
bargaining leverage to the creditor.
170. See Morrison, supra note 72, at 2 ("[Tlhere are instances where mortgages have been
successfully enforced without undue complication, especially over smaller properties, but the experience
is too limited to draw any firm conclusions at the present time."); see also Owen, supra note 119, at 72
(suggesting that security agreement is unlikely to be enforced literally).
171. Interview with Gao Peiji, Lawyer with Clifford Chance, Hong Kong, in Hong Kong (Aug. 12,
1994). After reading a draft of this article, which in substance matches the present Article, Gao (a very
experienced Chinese commercial lawyer trained in the United States) kindly suggested that my analysis
perhaps presented the Chinese system in too negative a light. He suggested that it would be more reflective
of Chinese realities if I first made a general statement that Chinese courts are likely to enforce security
agreements and then discussed problems present in the system. But see Jones et al., supra note 2, at
227-37. According to Professor Jones, the Chinese judiciary suffers from lack of education, lack of legal
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There are systemic factors in China that increase the likelihood that a
security agreement will be enforced. The involvement of government officials
or a powerful patron can help to resolve a dispute by ensuring that a particular
cause is heard, that the formal legal processes such as the courts work
properly, or that "extraofficial" or informal processes bring pressure to bear
in the right places."7 It is unknown to what extent such processes are
considered legitimate by the Chinese government. The recent anticorruption
campaign 73 suggests that informal processes will be discouraged. Still, the
very existence of the campaign suggests the present pervasive nature of
informal practices. Such factors are probably not considered an important part
of the legal system in the United States. In China, however, such informal
factors may constitute the very essence of the current legal system.
A. Against Debtors
This section develops the enforcement of security agreements in China
with respect to debtors. Special emphasis is placed on methods of enforcement
such as aspects of "self help" and more formal proceedings, which, while
playing a significant role in the United States, are emphasized differently in
China. This section also describes elements of enforcement unique to China's
legal system. Though none of these issues is discussed at great length, they
provide insight into developing and existing enforcement processes relating to
security.
As for enforcement practices related to third parties and the Chinese
government, Chinese paper law and practice are at such an early stage that
there is very little to describe. Therefore, although relevant to enforcement
against third parties and the government, the descriptions of self help,
elements of enforcement unique to China's legal system, and more formal
proceedings belong appropriately in this discussion of enforcement against
debtors.
1. Self Help
In the United States, self help is a regular feature of the system for
enforcing security interests.' 74 The lender, whether secured or unsecured,
has the option of repossession by self help if doing so can be accomplished
knowledge, corruption, and lack of power, Judicial decisions may be overridden by higher authorities,
influenced by outside interests, or ignored by those subject to the court's jurisdiction. The only real power
possessed by a judge arises from his or her bureaucratic rank without regard to his or her status as a
judge. Id.
172. See Owen, supra note 119, at 71, 72 ("Illn a case where a foreign lender had obtained a
judgment overseas against a Chinese guarantor and wished to enforce the judgment in China ... the Bank
of China stepped in and brought about a settlement between the parties.").
173. See Commentator Stresses Judicial Role in Fighting Corruption, FAzHI RIBAO BEIJING (in
Chinese), translated in 21 FBIS-CHI-93-204, Oct. 25, 1993, at 1; Alison Conner, Anticorruption
Legislation: Will More and Better Rules Curb Widespread Corruption?, E. ASIA ExEc. REP., Jan. 1989,
at 8.
174. See U.C.C. § 9-503 (1994); see also LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 125, ch. 4.
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without breaching the peace. 175 The scope of the self help remedy is limited
by law, circumstances of the case, and the nature of the collateral.176
The Chinese paper law says nothing about self help.177 Therefore, by
negative implication, security interests theoretically may be enforced by self
help. However, in practice, enforcement is almost entirely through the courts
or through arbitration tribunals."'8 It is true, however, that parties in China
are in practice engaging in very limited self help at the present time.'79 In
the Chinese context, however, self help merely means that parties are
enforcing carefully drafted self help provisions in agreements between the
parties.80 Thus, it appears that there is no explicitly recognized right to self
help in China.
Parties often consult with a local court before engaging in self help.,"
In one case involving substantial economic interests, the court told the
enforcing party to "please just do it yourself.""' The security at issue was
the certificate to a foreign party's share in a joint venture which was in the
possession of the guarantor lending institution. The guarantor enforced the
security agreement simply by informing the other party that it was enforcing
the security agreement."13
2. Chinese Methods
An additional de facto self help remedy exists in China which might be.
better understood if the "self" in self help is understood as "social self."
Aggrieved parties in China have traditionally resorted to extrajudicial social
175. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1994) ("Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to
take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process
if this can be done without breach of the peace.. ."); see also LoPucKi & WARREN, supra note 125,
ch. 4. For application of the rule see, e.g., Salisbury Livestock Co. v. Colorado Cent. Credit Union, 793
P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1990) (applying Wyoming's criminal breach of peace statute, WYo. STAT. 6-6-102(a)
(June 1988 Repl.), which reads, "[a] person commits breach of the peace if he disturbs the peace of a
community or its inhabitants by using threatening, abusive or obscene language or violent actions with
knowledge or probable cause to believe he will disturb the peace").
176. See, e.g., Ken Siegman, Software Supplier "Repossesses" Revlon's Computer Systems, Cmu.
Tam., Oct. 28, 1990, § 7, at 8.
177. See Oechsli, supra note 3, at 5 ("Chinese statutes do not provide any express guidance as to
a creditor's right to self-help."); Gao Interview (July 13, 1994), supra note 166 (noting that self-help is
"legal," or more precisely, not "illegal" as there are no regulations that require enforcement to go through
court proceedings).
178. See Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 12-13.
179. Gao Interview (July 13, 1994), supra note 166 (finding most self help enforcement is occurring
in Shenzhen, which was first locality to adopt security regulations; self help enforcement, however, is
occurring in other localities as well - even in places without security or mortgage regulations).
180. Gao Interview (July 13, 1994), supra note 166. Such agreements have included basic mortgage
and option contracts.
181. Gao Interview (July 13, 1994), supra note 166. Court involvement is especially important where
the property is required to be registered. Presumably it would be difficult, if not impossible, for one party
to change unilaterally the registration of another person's property without official involvement of-some
type. Both foreign and domestic parties should probably seek a court order before seeking to enforce
security agreements. Interview with Chen Jianlong, Chinese lawyer with C& C Law Office, Beijing, in
Hong Kong (July 13, 1994) [hereinafter Chen Interview (July 13, 1994)]. •
182. See Gao Interview (July 13, 1994), supra note 166. The court in this case had been extremely
reluctant to take the case in the first place. This was a novel problem in an unregulated area involving very.
powerful parties.
183. Gao Interview (July 13, 1994), supra note 166.
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pressure tactics to push aggrieving parties into compliance.' 4 Historically,
village headmen and clan or family leaders were sometimes called upon to
assert authority and to exert pressure on aggrieving parties."t 5 These
individuals could sometimes exert enormous pressure on a party to a dispute.
Failure to comply with obligations could result in social stigmatization or an
inability to function effectively in commercial matters. t8
These types of social pressure tactics still exist in China and can affect
foreign investors for good or ill, depending on the circumstances. For
example, creditors can pressure a noncomplying debtor (or any party to a
contract) to comply with the terms of the security agreement. 187 The
involvement of third parties has proven helpful by preventing direct
confrontation between adversaries. Direct confrontation may cause one or both
of the parties to "lose face," resulting in one or both of the parties digging in
their heels and refusing to cooperate.' The involvement of third parties
thus prevents escalation of disputes while providing opportunities for neutral
parties to broker a resolution. Third parties successfully playing this "face
saving" role have included Chinese partners, shareholders, and local
government officials such as local planning or economic commissions,
mayors, vice-mayors, and representatives.' 9
During the Maoist era, the CCP extensively used such social control
techniques as criticism meetings and campaigns to obtain social
compliance. 9 ' These techniques could be used to deal with such matters as
land ownership and crime, which those in the United States generally regard
as legal matters, 19' and were sometimes used to pressure individuals to give
184. See, e.g., GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, TRADITIONAL CHINESE PENAL LAW 157 (1990). Shame
and humiliation were considered just as important for regulating official conduct as were financial and
social consequences during the Tang and Qing periods.
185. See JAMIESON, supra note 15, at 68, 72 ("He is at once the peace officer and the Tribune of
the people - a terror to evil doers and the spokesman on behalf of the oppressed."). In other cases, the
aggrieved party might force his way onto the other party's property and refuse to leave until paid.
One individual informed me of a friend who once sought to obtain the repayment of a loan in China
by enlisting friends in the security administration to threaten a nonpaying debtor with an investigation and
possible punishment. This was illegal because the security administration is supposed to investigate
criminal cases only, not civil cases. The debtor could have successfully resisted these efforts and refused
to repay the debt. The debtor paid.
186. See JAMIESON, supra note 15, at 69 ("Whenever any individual wishes to do anything out of
the ordinary he must produce a kan chieh .... It is simply a document where the neighbours voluntarily,
freely, frankly (kan) pledge or bind (chieh) themselves by their personal knowledge, for the respectability
of the individual and his good faith. . . ."). To my knowledge, this practice is now obsolete.
187. See Patrick P. Hebert, Security in China: The Leasing Case, in TAKING AND ENFORCING
SECURITY IN CHINA, supra note 72, at 74, 77.
188. See Patrick P. Hebert, Security in China: The Leasing Case, in TAKING AND ENFORCING
SECURITY IN CHINA, supra note 72, at 77. The concept of face is really no different than pride or honor
in the United States, and the consequences of causing one to lose face in an oriental culture may be quite
similar. However, the concept may be more important in Chinese culture compared with that of the United
States, and the corresponding results from causing a loss of face may likewise seem more exaggerated.
189. See Patrick P. Hebert, Security in China: The Leasing Case, in TAKING AND ENFORCING
SECURITY IN CINA, supra note 72, at 77.
190. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 37-46. Criticism meetings were orchestrated by village groups
or work teams. Campaigns were orchestrated from the top levels of government and included criticism
meetings from the top levels of government to the bottom levels in the peasantry. Id. at 44-46.
191. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 37 ("Both can be and were used to accomplish purposes that
we would not recognize as legal, such as backing national policies like [o]pposing the United States and
[a]iding Korea or eliminating pests such as flies.").
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up "selfishness" and "bourgeois capitalist tendencies."' 92 Both brought
intense social pressure to bear either on an accused or on the public in
general.193 In criticism meetings, the accused usually admits faults or
wrongdoing and pledges to rectify bad behavior.194
Criticism meetings have waned in importance in recent years as Maoist
social pressure techniques have gone out of style in China. On the other hand,
"education" and "persuasion" are still advocated as the primary means of
obtaining compliance with desired policies, rules, outcomes of disputes, or
other desired behavioral norms.195 Clearly, social pressure and control
remain important in China. Campaigns (including the present and continuing
campaign to encourage foreign investment) are regular features of the current
system.' 96 As discussed previously, a powerful governmental or economic
contact in China can still be invaluable for facilitating enforcement in formal
channels, mediating disputes, or exerting influence in informal channels. 97
3. Formal Proceedings
This subsection briefly discusses the kinds of formal proceedings in China
to which one may resort in the event other methods of enforcement fail or
seem inappropriate. As discussed below, formal proceedings in China are of
several different types, including mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and
litigation. Less drastic forms of dispute resolution are preferred in China.19
Other authors have discussed more completely the content of dispute
resolution processes in the PRC. 199 This subsection primarily discusses
judicial processes with relation to the enforcement of security.2°" However,
192. In the words of one historian:
[All campaigns in Maoist China] followfed] this model more or less. That is, a policy is
determined by the central authority and is implemented by means of educating groups of
leaders at further and further removes from the top until the masses themselves are induced
to participate by intensive persuasion. The teaching is always by means of discussion.
Everyone has to participate and prove that he understands the policy. If there is any resistance,
it should be externalized and then eliminated. The most important part of the method is the
directed discussion so that everyone agrees verbally with the result - frequently after
criticizing his own previous resistance.
See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 45.
193. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 41-42. Criticism meetings and campaigns attempt to change
the very minds and consciousness of society. In meetings themselves, an accused would be brought before
a group of peers to be accused and interrogated (and sometimes beaten). If confession was forthcoming,
the penalty was meted out and usually softened.
194. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 45.
195. See Epstein, supra note 30, at 40.
196. See Epstein, supra note 30, at 40.
197. There is some feeling that the recent corruption campaigns have been targeted in part at
inappropriate peddling of influence and abuse of position. See David R. Schweisberg, Anti-Corruption
Campaign Hits Top Levels, UPI, Oct. 15, 1988, available in LEXIS, International Library, Asia Pacific
File (indicating that recent campaign against corruption is aimed to stem nepotism, influence trading, and
strong arm tactics tied to profiteering now rampant in China).
198. See Lubman, Mao and Mediation, supra note 37, at 325 ("[Mlediation is the universally
favored mode of dispute resolution .... ").
199. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 14; Lubman, supra note 11, at 224-26; Lubman; Mao and
Mediation, supra note 37, at 1345-75 (outlining proliferation of mediation in settling disputes in China).
200. One reason for the limitation here is the limited number of reported cases. The few reported
cases in existence all involve judicial proceedings.
1996]
214 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 183
other formal dispute resolution mechanisms are involved.
In the United States, as in China, where self help fails to meet the needs
of an aggrieved lender, the lender may resort to formal channels of
enforcement. Lenders and other holders of security interests in the United
States resort to the courts as a matter of course. Foreclosure proceedings are
very common in the United States. After a favorable decision, collateral is
auctioned.2 o1
As in the United States, it is the secured party in China who initiates
enforcement proceedings. 22 After consideration of the matter, the court may
issue a decision immediately or conduct mediation between the parties.
203
After the court's decision or agreement, the parties may appeal or may
implement the decision or agreement voluntarily; if a party does neither, the
secured party may file an application for enforcement.2"
At this point, the zhixing ting (enforcement department)215 of the court
may become involved and exert pressure on the other party to fulfill its
obligations." 6 If a party continues to fail to cooperate, the court may issue
a "writ of assistance," 7 notice of execution, or notice of enforcement. 8
The court may also seek to compel enforcement by issuing search warrants
and by sending enforcement personnel of the court to search for and seize the
secured property.2"9 The court may impose fines, garnishment of wages and
201. See LoPucKI & WARREN, supra note 125, ch. 2.
'202. See Property Confiscated in Loan Enforcement, CHINA L. & PRAC., Nov. 5, 1992, at 25, 25-
26.
203. See id.; Court Orders Enforcement of Mortgage Agreements, CHINA L. & PRAc., Apr. 9, 1992,
at 21. ("The Bank instituted proceedings in the Huangshi Municipal Intermediate People's Court ...
which conducted mediation between the Factory and the Bank.").
204. See Property Confiscated in Loan Enforcement, supra note 202, at 25 ("None of the parties
involved appealed following the decision at first instance. After the decision came into effect, it was not
implemented by the parties, with [one] exception .... On 17 April 1990, Guangzhuang Credit Society
filed an application for enforcement."); see also Court Orders Enforcement of Mortgage Agreements, supra
note 203 ("[T]he following agreement was reached: the Factory agreed to mortgage its factory buildings
and production equipment ... and to repay its loans with interest in installments.") After the factory failed
to comply with the agreement, the bank applied to the court for execution and the court issued a notice
of execution. Court Orders Enforcement of Mortgage Agreements, supra note 203.
205. Literally, this means "court of enforcement" or "court of implementation." As its function
relates to enforcing and implementing the decisions of other court departments, it seems reasonable at a
functional level to equate this with the sheriff. According to Oechsli, supra note 3, at 5, these enforcement
personnel include "the 'execution officer and the court clerk,' with the assistance of bailiffs in 'important'
proceedings."(quoting Civil Procedure Law art. 163).
206. See, e.g., Property Confiscated in Loan Enforcement, supra note 202, at 25 (describing case
in which, after court applied repeated pressure, three of four parties performed part of obligation). See
also Zheng Interview.(July 21, 1994), supra note 165.
207. Oechsli, supra note 3, at 5 (quoting Civil Procedure Law arts. 164, 171).
208. In the case cited supra note 206, the court then "issued a Notice of Enforcement to the parties,
in accordance with Article 170 of the PRC Civil Procedure Law (Trial Implementation)." Upon receipt
of the notice, three parties implemented plans for performance, though the fourth (Li Wentong) continued
in his recalcitrance. Property Confiscated in Loan Enforcement, supra note 202, at 25.
209. -The court in the case cited supra notes 202, 204, and 206 eventually had to resort to such
measures to compel the-fourth party, Li Wentong, to perform:
[lin accordance with Article 172 of the Civil Procedure Law (Trial Implementation) and with
the approval of its President, -the court sealed a portion of Li Wentong's property ... and
appointed Li Wentong responsible for custody of the sealed property. Li Wentong was notified
that he would be permitted to use such property but not to sell or transfer it during the custody
period. However, not only did Li Wentong fail to perform his obligations under the Notice
of Enforcement, he also sold the sealed [propertyl and concealed the money he received in
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savings, or detention on those refusing to cooperate.21
The enforcement of security through Chinese courts is occurring in actual
practice. 211 However, it is impossible to determine what percentage of cases
requiring enforcement are referred to the courts, and of these, what
percentage are successful. Since the purpose of this Article is to analyze the
Chinese system of taking and enforcing security, a review of some practical
problems to enforcement is instructive and provides essential insight into the
function of China's legal system.
Court orders are often disregarded in practice212 or are only grudgingly
obeyed.2 3 One of the few reported cases involving the enforcement of a
mortgage, here a mortgage on a factory building and equipment, illustrates the
problems faced by the Chinese courts. In this case, a factory manager
attempted to assign all of the mortgaged property for consideration to a third
party after the court had issued a notice of execution to the factory.214 Upon
learning of this, the court ordered that the factory and property be sealed.
After the sealing of the property by replacing the lock, the deputy director of
the factory directed ten factory workers to break the lock on the factory door
and transfer the remaining materials to another factory. The court's execution
personnel attempted to stop this occurrence but were attacked by the deputy
director and the workers, and all of the moveable property that had been
sealed was moved. The court, with the approval of the president of the court,
imposed a fine and fifteen days detention on certain key individuals who soon




Since Li Wentong refused to implement the court's decision and also concealed
property... in accordance with Article 227 of the PRC Civil Procedure Law ... . the i
County People's Court issued a search warrant signed by the president of the court. A search
was conducted of Li Wentong and of his domicile. [Certain property was found,] This
property was immediately seized and Li Wentong was ordered to perform his obligations
under the decision within a limited period of time. Li Wentong consented to use the [property]
to repay the loans, and drew up a plan for repayment of the outstanding amount ink
installments.
Property Confiscated in Loan Enforcement, supra note 202, at 25. In theory, those conducting the
enforcement proceedings must show identification documents and record the details of the execution on
the secured property. "A list of sequestered or attached items must be prepared and witnessed by persons
present at the time of the seizure." Oechsli, supra note 3, at 5.
210. See Oechsli, supra note 3, at 5.
211. See Zheng Interview (July 21, 1994), supra note 165; Gao Interview (July 21; 1994), supra
note 142.
212. Chen Interview (July 13, 1994), supra note 181; Interview with Zheng Shujun, Chinese lawyer
with C & C Law Office, Beijing, in Hong Kong (Aug. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Zheng Interview (Aug. 4,
1994)] (banks beginning to yield more easily to courts as practice of enforcement by courts becomes more
common in China; refusals by companies are still common, but courts are willing to detain individuals in
appropriate cases). The Chinese lawyers I interviewed always treated such topics very 'delicately.
Responses to questions about the function of the Chinese legal system almost always initially were textbook
answers of how the system is supposed to work on paper. Careful questioning sometimes brought out
revealing insights. Some Chinese seemed rather embarrassed to admit that the-system does not work as
it is supposed to work on paper.
213. See Court Orders Enforcement of Mortgage Agreements, supra note 203, at 21.
214. Court Orders Enforcement of Mortgage Agreements, supra note 203, at 21.
215. Court Orders Enforcement of Mortgage Agreements, supra note 203, at 21.
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One of the biggest problems of enforcement is localism21 6 within the
courts themselves.2 7 It occurs in part because of the structure of China's
judicial system, in which the courts are not independent from politics, the
general administrative structure of the government, or the CCP. 218 The
courts are also not isolated from local interests and may even be used as tools
to promote national and local policies and purposes.219
The CCP sets short and long term goals and directives for the courts.220
Administrative positions of the courts and administrative organizations often
overlap with positions in the CCP.21 In some cases, a judicial committee
makes decisions for the court after consultation with individuals, officials, and
party members outside of the court.' It is not difficult to imagine the
dilemma a Chinese judge could face. Regardless of the equities of a given
case, a Chinese judge may have little choice but to succumb to any of a
number of political pressures that may be exerted from any direction. Party
members and others engaging in "bureaucratism " m exacerbate the
216. For my definition of localism see supra note 49.
217. Gao Interview (July 21, 1994), supra note 142 (describing case in which local company speaks
with local government which speaks with court, and court rules against any non-local party). Chinese
courts may treat domestic Chinese and foreign parties equally because although domestic and local bias
is likely to exist, present policies favor the encouragement of foreign investment in China. Interview with
Gao Peiji, Lawyer with Clifford Chance, Hong Kong, in Hong Kong (Aug. 5, 1994) (claiming that courts
are likely to treat foreign and Chinese parties equally). This result is furthered by judicial decisions which
do not manifestly disfavor foreigners. Although this may be true, I have no direct proof that this is the
case.
218. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 49-54. As Lubman points out, "[a]lthough on paper the
judiciary was formally distinct from other state organizations and the Party, in practice it remained
essentially undifferentiated from the administrative apparatus of the state." Lubman, supra note 11, at 201.
Lubman further states:
[Tihe leadership seems to expect the formal legal system to do considerably more than help
maintain order. A greater activism is required by the courts, judges are expected to be
responsive to current policies such as punishing criminals guilty of disrupting social order and
economic criminals such as venal officials. The courts are expected to march in step with the
rest of China's officialdom to carry out whatever policies are viewed as necessary to stimulate
further progress toward modernization.
Id. at 255.
219. Gao Interview (July 21, 1994), supra note 142; see Lubman, supra note 11, at 245 ("Unlike
the Anglo-American model in which courts are theoretically impartial agencies for adjudicating conflicts,
Chinese courts under the Communist Party have been seen and used as active participants in the
implementation of Party and state policies."); see also Allen & Overy, supra note 137, at 1 ("Enforcement
is subject to the same wide administrative discretion, pressure to compromise and local bias that affect
other governmental and judicial actions in the PRC.").
220. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 246-47.
221. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 246-47 ("[Slome blurring of the line between activities of the
courts and of the Party continues to exist, reflected in the continued side-by-side existence of trials and
administrative punishments.").
222. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 49-54.
223. Lubman describes "bureaucratism" in-this way:
The term is used to describe major abuses of power by State and Party officials, including the
tendency to treat one's area of jurisdiction as a private domain; feeling superior to others of
lesser rank; insistence on special privileges; feeling responsibility only to superiors in rank,
whose favors are pursued, often by flattery and extravagant measures; corruption,
embezzlement of public funds, misappropriation of state property, accepting and giving bribes;
and interceding on behalf of relatives and friends. Media accounts abound with this type of
conduct, often engaged in by cadres over long periods of time and on a large scale before they
were apprehended and punished.
Lubman, supra note 11, at 241.
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problems.
Another peculiarity of the Chinese legal system that adds to the
unpredictability of enforcement is the strong preference for settlement by
mediation or conciliation instead of deliberating, making, and enforcing a
judgment, as is more common in the United States. 4 The preference for
settling disputes through methods of compromise is stronger in China than in
the West.' The implication for security is that the holder of a security
interest is less likely to be secure. It is unlikely that a court will give an
entirely favorable decision to one of the parties to a dispute. Compromise
judgments, wherein the secured party receives only a portion of the remedy
sought, are likely to prevail even where the other party was clearly in the
wrong. Where a court is interested in preserving face between parties, it is
unlikely to enforce a security interest as readily as a U.S. court would in the
same situation.
A peculiar aspect of Chinese law practice is that Chinese lawyers spend
much of their time seeking to establish better connections than the opposing
counsel. 6  With historic antecedents, 7  the practice constitutes an
interesting (and, for foreigners, unsettling) element of China's legal
system." Litigation practice in China becomes a guanxi (connections) 9
competition wherein good Chinese counsel are best identified by their
connections or their ability to establish good connections. These connections
and related abilities best identify the winners. 23 The side that wins does not
224. See Owen, supra note 119, at 72 ("[Clourts will sometimes refuse to give judgment on a case
and insist instead that the parties first endeavour to settle their differences through mediation.").
225. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 224-27. For example, Lubman reports that "Chinese factory
officials have told this author and other foreigners interested in economic dispute resolution that they
would strongly prefer to reach a compromise in a dispute rather than take the matter to a court." Id. at
227.
226. Interview with Gao Peiji, Lawyer with Clifford Chance, Hong Kong, in Hong Kong (Aug. 13,
1994) [hereinafter Gao Interview (Aug. 13, 1994)] ("Some lawyers prefer not to become litigators -
unless for large foreign firms - for this very reason.").
227. See Lee, supra note 14, at 1358-59. Lee discusses the role mediators played in the early part
of the century:
As conduits, legal brokers, or middlemen, lawyers made the courts more accessible to the
Chinese merchant. Attorneys of various nationalities who had emigrated to China founded
their own local bar associations in Shanghai, and some were particularly skilled at petitioning
judges to view their clients' cases favorably. At first foreign, and later Chinese, lawyers
cultivated their ties with the courts and used their influence to gain strategic advantages for
their clients. After 1926, factions of Chinese lawyers developed around certain judges with
whom they cultivated ties, often based on the law school they had both attended.
Id.
228. See supra note 35; see also Gene Linn, UPI, Dec. 20, 1992 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File ("Without a democratic and accountable government and without the rule of law, Hong Kong
will experience a surge in corruption and guanxi (dependence on connections) that is endemic across the
border and the international business community will lose confidence. .. ").
The social phenomenon of guanxi as an element of Chinese society is well documented. See, e.g.,
Joyce Barnlathan et al., China: Is Prosperity Creating a Freer Society?, Bus. WEEK, June 6, 1994, at 94,
96 ("[China is] a country where the rule of law has long been subordinate to guanxi, or personal
connections. . . ."); Lucian Pye, China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1990, at
56, 64-65; John A. Reeder, When West Meets East, Bus. HoRizoNs, Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 69.
229. See Lee, supra note 14, at 1359 ("It appears that the closer the relationship between the lawyer
and the judge, the higher the fee the lawyer could charge.").
230. Guanri, which may also be referred to as kinship or friendship ties, is a social phenomenon not
limited to China. See, e.g., Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language in Overseas Business, HARV. Bus.
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present the most compelling legal arguments but rather wins the guanxi battle
and has more powerful people supporting its cause."a As a result,
enforceability of security agreements is less predictable in China than it is in
the United States. 2 Decisions will usually favor economically or otherwise
more powerful individuals or organizations.3
Some of the unpredictability of enforcement in Chinese court proceedings
can be avoided by undergoing weijaiwude gongzheng (special notarization of
debts) of the security agreement. 4 Although notarization of the security
agreement is an essential step to enforcement by any Chinese court, 5
special notarization has the added benefit of providing an avenue for the
secured party to avoid completely formal court proceedings by directly
commencing enforcement proceedings in the enforcement department of the
court. 6  Special notarization is only available, however, when the
underlying obligation is in the "nature of a liability."" Even when special
notarization is possible, practical problems to enforcement remain.2
8
B. Third Parties
This section discusses the state of enforcement in China with relation to
third parties as compared to the state of enforcement in the United States, and
reviews Chinese law with respect to "priority." "Priority" is a key feature in
U.S. secured transactions law that may one day become significant in China
as well. "Priority," as understood. in the United States, is not a widely
understood concept in China. Accordingly, the ability to enforce a security
agreement against third parties appears negligible in China when compared
with the United States.
In the United States, the ability of a party to enforce its security interest
against third parties is an essential feature of secured transactions law. By
creating a security interest, the party obtains priority in the collateral over
unsecured claimants. 9 By perfecting the security interest, the party obtains
REV., May-June 1960, at 87, 91 ("Friends and family around the world represent a sort of social insurance
that would be difficult to find in the United States.").
231. Gao Interview (July 21, 1994), supra note 142.
232. Gao Interview (July 21, 1994), supra note 142. Two potential ways around these difficulties
may include retaining different Chinese law firms that may have connections at strategic locations, and
for some issues, taking the case to a higher court if it is possible to resolve the jurisdiction issue. Id.
233. Gao Interview (July 21, 1994), supra note 142.
234. Zheng Interview (July 19, 1994), supra note 73.
235. Zheng Interview (July 19, 1994), supra note 73.
236. Zheng Interview (July 19, 1994), supra note 73. As special notarization involves the
enforcement department of the courts, the procedure is analogous to a confession ofjudgment in the United
States. The special notarization takes place as part of the initial transaction rather than after a default has
occurred. Hence, the procedure is also analogous to a power of sale clause or a deed of trust executed in
the real estate setting to avoid the necessity of formal foreclosure proceedings.
237. Zheng Interview (Aug. 4, 1994), supra note 212.
238. Even if the courts cooperate, which may be a questionable assumption, there is no guarantee
that the debtor will cooperate with the creditor or the enforcement department of the court by giving up
the collateral.
239. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-201 (1994).
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priority over subsequently secured parties. 2" In essence, the secured party
with priority may enforce its preferred claim against uisecured parties if the
secured party obtains possession of the collateral or against subsequently
perfected secured parties, even if those parties have enforced their security
interest in the collateral and have taken possession.24 The secured creditor
is assured the right to obtain possession of the collateral itself or the cash
equivalent of its interest in the collateral.242
Although Chinese law is beginning to recognize the concept of priority
on paper, in practice it is unlikely that the holder of a security interest will be
able to enforce this interest against another interest holder that has already
enforced its interest.243 This will be the case even when the secured party
has completed all required procedures, including notarization and
registration. 2'
One reason for this state of affairs is that the Chinese courts have not yet
recognized the concept of priority.2 45 Another reason is that some Chinese
courts still lack the sophistication to understand such a complex legal
doctrine.2' There are perhaps more fundamental reasons related to
enforcement that would explain why the Chinese courts have not begun to
recognize the ability of a secured party to enforce its interests against third
parties.
The same enforcement problems preventing the enforcement of security
interests against third parties on the basis of priority also prevent the
enforcement of security in analogous situations. The Chinese courts are likely,
and in some cases may be required, to take a lenient view of debtors.247 The
Chinese courts are unlikely to allow a secured party to enforce its security
against an unsecured third party that has enforced a claim against the grantor
of the security interest and taken possession of the collateral.24 Chinese
240. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1994) ("Conflicting security interests rank according'to priority in
time of filing or perfection. Priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering the collateral or
the time the security interest is first perfected, whichever is earlier ....").
241. This analysis ignores the presence of lien holders in the collateral. However, these are treated
in a similar fashion. With some exceptions, the first to come into existence, the lien or the perfected
security interest, will determine the priority of the relative interests in competitions between lien holders
and secured parties. See id; U.C.C. § 9-301 (1994); LoPucKI & WARREN, supra note 125, ch. 2.
242. See LoPucmi & WARREN, supra note 125, ch.2.
243. Interview with Zheng Shujun, Lawyer with C & C Law Office, Beijing, in Hong Kong (July
23, 1994) [hereinafter Zheng Interview (July 23, 1994)].
244. Id.
245. See id. (noting that Supreme People's Court is probably prepared to recognize concept of
priority).
246. See Jones et al., supra note 2, at 227 ("[Jludges may simply lack the education necessary to
do the job competently.").
247. As Oechsli points out:
Equally troublesome are the [Civil Procedure Law's] provisions that the court shall grant a
stay of execution upon presentation of a "reasonable objection" by a person not a party to the
action or where the person against whom execution is enforced does not have the financial
means to pay off his debts within a short time.
Oechsli, supra note 3, at 6 (quoting Civil Procedure Law art. 182(3)). A stay may also be granted "where
the court determines that a stay is appropriate." Civil ProcedureLaw, supra note 79, at art. 182.-
248. Zheng Interview (July 23, 1994), supra note 243. This opinion is supported by the rather
unclear provision of article 182 of the Civil Procedure Law, which "suggests that a nonparty to an
execution proceeding could have a priority claim (e.g., because it is a wage claim) to proceeds even if its
claim were unsecured." Oechsli, supra note 3, at 6.
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courts, as in the United States, are also unlikely to require a bona fide third
party purchaser of the security to return the collateral. 249
Essentially, a secured party in China is only secure to the extent that
possession of the security can be prevented from passing into the hands of
third parties. Thus, in practice, China has no concept of security against third
parties - except to the extent just mentioned - and the concept of priority
is likewise nonexistent in practice2so
Priority as a legal doctrine in China is in its infancy in many respects.
The Civil Code mentions priority but says nothing about what priority
means." For example, it -says nothing about how to handle disputes
between creditors with security interests in the same collateral. Priority is
explained more completely in the Civil Procedure Law,z in the liquidation
setting, 3 and perhaps most significantly, in the real estate mortgage
setting. 4 According to at least one Chinese lawyer, priority has a place in
China. 5
In the United States, priority generally depends upon the date of filing or
perfection. 6 In China, the date the security interest is registered establishes
priority (the "date of priority"). 7 Because mandatory registration creates
a valid security interest, the date of priority often coincides with the creation
of a valid security interest." This is true for land use rights1 9 as well as
249. E.g., Fujian Province Secured Loan Regulations art. 29 (May 1, 1991) ("When property that
is required to be registered has not been registered, a bonafide third party may not be opposed.").
250. See Zheng Interview (July 23, 1994), supra note 243. Some Chinese lawyers advise dealing
with the problem by including a covenant to pay in the security agreement. However, such a mechanism
may only be effective if the owner of the security is solvent and the courts are willing to enforce the
contractual arrangement; the latter may be unlikely. See Owen, supra note 119, at 72 (noting that Chinese
courts will overlook terms of contracts, for example, in order to reach equitable solution to dispute).
251. Civil Code, supra note 76, at arts. 84, 85. If the debtor fails to discharge its debt according
to the contract terms, the creditor shall have the right to "receive priority in payment" by converting the
security to its value or by selling the secured assets.
252. According to that law:
Where charged property is used as security for bank loans of other credit or used as other
guarantee, the bank or other creditor shall have priority in receiving repayment with respect
to such guarantee .... After priority payment of the insolvency expenses from the property
of the insolvent enterprise, the remaining property shall be applied to repayment in the
following order: 1) wages of staff and workers and labor insurance premiums owed by the
insolvent enterprise; 2) taxes owed by the insolvent enterprise; and 3) insolvency claims. If
the assets available for distribution is insufficient to repay all the debts within the same order
or priority, it shall be distributed on a pro-rata basis.
Civil Procedure Law, supra note 79, at arts. 203-04.
253. Shanghai Municipality Regulations on the Liquidation of Foreign Investment Enterprises art.
46 (Aug. 16, 1991) (effective Oct. 1, 1991); Beijing Municipality Regulations, Liquidation of Foreign
Investment Enterprises Procedures art. 27 (June 1, 1992).
254. Law of China for the Administration of Real Estate in Mainland Cities and Municipalities art.
50 (July 5, 1994) (effective Jan. 1, 1995) ("For land use rights in which a mortgage has been created and
which have been obtained through allocation [by the Chinese government], after paying the appropriate
land use rights transfer fee out of the price obtained for the auctioned land, the mortgagee may have
priority in obtaining compensation.").
255. See Zheng Interview (July 19, 1994), supra note 73.
256. See LOPuCKI & WARREN, supra note 125, ch. 19.
257. Chen Interview (July 7, 1994), supra note 106.
258. Guangdong Secured Loans, supra note 81, art. 18 ("The date of registration of the above
security shall be the date on which the security is established. From the date of registration the security
shall be legally effective."); Beijing Municipality Measures for the Administration of Real Estate
Mortgages arts. 27, 30 (Apr. 20, 1994) (section III entitled "Formation and Administration of Mortgage
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for other types of property,26 ° but as in the United States, is not true under
optional registration. Unregistered security interests in land use rights and in
other property required to be registered are invalid under the regulations and
therefore can have no priority. It is unknown how unrecorded security
interests not required to be registered will rank against one another.261
The Supreme People's Court has given some guidance on the treatment
of third parties relative to security interests."' Any sale, transfer, or other
disposition of a secured asset without consent of the secured party is void.263
Thus, the secured party has a kind of contractual "absolute priority" and can
theoretically enforce against third parties receiving the secured property. This,
of course, is not quite the meaning ascribed to "priority" in the United States.
The Supreme People's Court has said nothing to date about the priorities of
competing secured parties when multiple parties have created valid security
interests in the same collateral.
Although as of August 1994 the Supreme Peoples' Court had not decided
any case according to the Western concept of priority, this court probably will
not strongly oppose the concept as understood in the United States.2' Some
Chinese law firms, but by no means all, would presently be willing to render
a legal opinion to the effect that, under current Chinese law, the first lender
to record its security agreement can enforce the security agreement in a
Chinese court against another secured party who records after the first party.
The rationale for such an opinion would be that this is an accepted
international practice and that the practice is reasonable.
265
Contracting parties should be aware that such an opinion probably would
be given only if the facts showed that there had been a contractual
arrangement between the mortgagor and the mortgagee indicating that the
mortgagor could not mortgage the property again without the mortgagee's
approval. Many Chinese law firms would not go even this far at the present
time.
266
Loan Contracts" states: "Within 30 days of the execution of the real estate mortgage contract, the
mortgagor must register the mortgage with the real estate administration or land administration agencies.
Art. 30 Real Estate mortgages not going through registration at the registration department are invalid");
Trial Measures of Guangzhou Municipality on the Compensatory Transfer and Assignment of Urban State-
owned Land art. 30 (May 3, 1989) (effective June 1, 1989) ("Within 30 days of the notarising of a
mortgage contract, the two parties to the mortgage shall present to the Municipal Real Estate Bureau...
and shall undertake registration procedures. Any mortgage which has not been registered shall be deemed
to be invalid.").
259. See Trial Measures of Guangzhou Municipality on the Compensatory Transfer and Assignment
of Urban State-owned Land art. 30 (May 3, 1989) (effective June 1, 1989); see also Stuart Valentine &
Clara Tang, Legal Aspects of Financing Property Development in the PRC, in THE HONG KONG
DmEcTOR's LAW YEARBOOK 26 (1993).
260. See Wang, supra note 87, at 12 ("From the regulations, it would appear that the registration
requirement of security documents relates mainly to those affecting real estate, properties which are
originally subject to registration (e.g. patents and trademarks) and guarantees.").
261. See Wang, supra note 87, at 12.
262. Opinion (Civil Law General Principles), supra note 79, art. 115.
263. Opinion (Civil Law General Principles), supra note 79, art. 115.
264. Zheng Interview (July. 19, 1994), supra note 73.
265. Zheng Interview (July 19, 1994), supra note 73.
266. Zheng Interview (July 19, 1994), supra note 73
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C. The Government
This section discusses areas in which the holder of a security interest may
be required to enforce its security interest in actions involving the
government. With relation to China, the analysis and conclusions in this
section are hypothetical, as the author is aware of no actual case involving the
Chinese government. Chinese lawyers seem convinced, however, that private
parties can enforce security interests in actions involving the Chinese
government. As indicated elsewhere, what Chinese lawyers think the law is
may have significance in itself. 67
The situation in which the holder of a security interest is most likely to
encounter the Chinese government is that in which private land use rights are
expropriated for government sponsored or sanctioned projects. In this
situation, it is clear that compensation will be paid to the holder or owner of
the land use rights. 6 However, the position of a security interest holder is
less clear. One Chinese lawyer assured the author that the security interest
would continue in the compensation moneys and in any property purchased
with the moneys - essentially, the "proceeds" of the secured property.269
Thus, it would appear that, as in the United States, enforcement proceedings
against the Chinese government would rarely be necessary, as disposition of
the security interest remains essentially a private matter.
A caveat is in order, however. As in the United States, if the land use
rights originally were not obtained legally, or if the holder of the land use
rights failed to fulfill its obligation to develop the land according to the land
use rights contract, the security interest would cease to exist.27 This is
because a security interest is considered a "secondary interest" under Chinese
law.27 Thus, if the Chinese government were to expropriate land use rights
that originally were not obtained legally, not only would the owner's interest
in the land be extinguished, but the secured party would also be unable to
enforce the security interest in the proceeds because the interest would be
considered to have been invalid from the outset.272 To compound matters,
the government has the right to take back land use rights without
compensation where the obligation to develop the land has not been
fulfilled.2' Therefore, 'there would be no proceeds in which the secured
267. See Jones et al., supra note 2.
268. See, e.g., Law of the People's Republic of China on Land Management, 6th Nat'l People's
Cong., 16th Sess. (June 25, 1986) (amended Dec. 29, 1988).
269. Interview with Chen Jianlong, Lawyer with C & C Law Office, Beijing, in Hong Kong (Aug.
-3, 1994).
270. The land use rights contract is a device used in all transfers of land in China. The contract is
essentially an agreement between the Chinese government and the land grantee establishing certain
obligations on the part of the grantee, including obligations to develop the land in a particular manner
bargained for between the parties.
271. See Wang, supra note 87, at 9 ("Chinese law considers security rights as secondary rights so
that if the obligation which is secured by the security turns out to be invalid, the security obligations will
also be automatically discharged.").
272. See Wang, supra note 87, at 9.
273. See Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 5.
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party's security interest could continue.274
The situations in which the holder of a security interest in the United
States is most likely to encounter the United States government are in eminent
domain and government seizure cases. In eminent domain cases, similar to
China, the security interest continues in the award proceeds.275 Where all
of the property subject to the security interest is taken, the secured party is
entitled to so much of the award as is necessary to satisfy the debt.276 In
partial condemnation cases, the secured party automatically receives either the
entire award, 2' the amount of the award that will compensate the secured
party for the impairment of the security, or a portion of the award based on
the ratio that the debt bears to the security.27 In the eminent domain
context, enforcement remains essentially a matter of private enforcement
between private parties.
Ordinarily, the secured party must be given notice and opportunity to
appear in the condemnation proceeding.279 A secured party who is not joined
in such a proceeding retains the right either to foreclose on the condemned
property, 20 to seek and obtain a revaluation and new award in an amount
sufficient to satisfy the-secured claim, or to proceed against the government
itself. 21  The requirement that secured parties must be joined in
condemnation proceedings illustrates a basic policy of protecting secured
creditors in the United States. 2 Even when private parties are joined in
common proceedings with the United States government, they retain
significant rights against the government. On the other hand, although the
government must compensate interested parties, it retains the right to condemn
land and buildings so long as it does not abuse its authority to do so.
V. LIQUIDATING THE SECURITY AFTER ENFORCEMENT
This part discusses liquidation law, which is in its infancy in China. To
date, China has no national liquidation law, and in practice, liquidating the
security after enforcement is probably one of the most difficult problems with
taking security, especially for foreign parties. It is often difficult to locate
markets for second hand goods in China.28 3 Therefore, in some cases the
only practical method for liquidating the security may be to transport it out of
274. See Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 5-6 ("To protect their security interest, foreign lenders are
therefore advised to seek an arrangement with the Land Administration before taking security.").
275. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHrTMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.12, at 147 (3d ed.
1994) ("Where mortgaged land is taken by eminent domain the mortgagee's rights in the land follow the
award and attach to it.").
276. Id.
277. Id. at 148 ("One view gives the mortgagee the entire amount of the award without
distinguishing whether the mortgage has been foreclosed or even whether it has matured.").
278. Id. This method preserves the debt to security ratio.
279. Id. This is expressly mandated by statute in at least half of the states and mandated by judicial
interpretation in many others. There are a few jurisdictions, however, in which this is not the case.
280. Id. at 150 ("Some courts hold that the land condemned is still subject to his mortgage and the
mortgagee can foreclose on it.").
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See Hebert, supra note 187, 188, 189, at 76.
1996]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 183
the country for sale.2" There are very few published examples where
liquidation has been successful.
A secured party in China may liquidate its security after foreclosure in
a manner provided for in local regulations.285 There are usually three
methods of liquidation under most local regulations: auction, assignment, and
encashment.286 The principal method is auction.2 7
Auctions are presently being carried out primarily in China's SEZs and
coastal regions. 288 However, some of the auctions occur in the absence of
published regulations. Where published regulations do exist, they contain very
little detail and do little more than enable, authorize, or legitimize the
development of local practices. 289 Enforcement activity in the absence of
published or detailed regulations indicates the existence of developed
customary practices, practical necessity, or perhaps internal regulations
authorizing these practices. 90
The auction procedures that have been set out in some regulations closely
parallel United States procedures. For example, the regulation in Guangdong
Province stipulates that: (1) the lender must submit an application for auction
and relevant documents to the auction organization; (2) the auction
organization should check and authenticate the ownership of the secured
property and establish a minimum price; (3) the auction organization should
publicly announce the auction in a local paper for a period of thirty days; (4)
the auction should be carried out by the auction organization after the
284. See Hebert, supra note 187, 188, 189, at 78. This is very difficult in practice. In the case of
leased equipment, the lessor was forced to take possession of the equipment and make arrangements to
export it to Hong Kong. This was made possible through the help of a cooperative government official
who steered the lessor through the complexities of Chinese customs. Id.
285. Civil Code, supra note 76, at art. 89(c); see also Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 12.
286. See, e.g., Guangdong Secured Loans, supra note 81, art. 25 ("The lender shall dispose of the
secured property in the following ways: (1) auction; (2) assignment agreement; or (3) encashment.");
Wuhan Municipality, Administration of Real Property Mortgage Procedures art. 34 (June 9, 1992),
reprinted and translated in TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA, supra note 72, at 23, 28 ("A
mortgagee may apply to dispose of a security in one of the following ways: (1) apply to the municipal real
property exchange for public auction; (2) commission the real property exchange to sell the security; or
(3) other methods approved by the Municipal Real Property Bureau.").
287. See, e.g., Tianjin Economic and Technical Development Zone, Administration of Real Property
Mortgage Loan Procedures art. 36, reprinted and translated in TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN
CHINA, supra note 72, at 41; see also numerous local regulations cited supra note 81.
For statutory bases for the practices see, e.g., Guangzhou Property Mortgages, supra note 81, art.
37; Tianjin Mortgage Loan Procedures, supra note 81, arts. 36-37, 39. ("When no one purchases
mortgaged property at auction, other methods that may be used are: (1) both parties to the mortgage agree
to transfer the ownership of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee, and carry out the procedures for
the transfer of ownership of the property; (2) a replacement security provided for in the contract is
auctioned; or (3) other methods agreed upon by both parties."); Fujian Secured Loans, supra note 81, art.
42; Shanghai Mortgage Loans, supra note 81, art. 26.
288. Zheng Interview (Aug. 4, 1994), supra note 212; Interview with Chen Jianlong, Chinese lawyer
with C & C Law Office, Beijing, in Hong Kong (Aug. 4, 1994) ("I have seen auctions advertised in
newspapers.... I am certain auctions are being carried out in China at the present time."). Apparently
such auctions are advertised in local newspapers because I am not aware of any such notices being
published in such national newspapers as Fazhi Ribao (Legal Daily) or Renmin Ribao (People's Daily).
289. Gao Interview (Aug. 13, 1994), supra note 226.
290. Professor Jones has explained the existence of detailed internal regulations governing various
aspects of China's bureaucracy. Some of these aspects are set out more completely under the first chapter
of Jones et al., supra note 2.
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expiration of the notice period, provided that the rights of possession29" ' in
the property are not in dispute; (5) the payment of a transfer tax and the
transfer of registration of the property should be carried out at the conclusion
of the auction; (6) taxes owed and repayment loan principal and interest
should be paid; and (7) remaining proceeds from the auction should be paid
to the borrower after the costs of the auction are deducted. 92
Liquidation by assignment is analogous to strict foreclosure in the United
States and applies in practice primarily to satisfaction of debts secured by real
property. 293 However, there appears to be no logical reason why this kind
of foreclosure should not be equally useful for satisfaction of debts secured by
other kinds of property. For liquidation by assignment to occur, the court
must first determine that the secured party holds title to the asset. Then, the
court grants possession to the secured party and presumably cancels all or part
of the underlying debt.294 According to the regulations in Guangdong
Province, possession is transferred only after an undefined "independent
organization" appointed by the court determines that the asset's market value
is less than or equal to the value of the underlying debt.2 95 It can be
concluded that liquidation by assignment cannot occur otherwise. In practice,
assignments and transfers of all kinds of property in satisfaction of debts
probably occur without regard to these paper requirements.
Encashment refers to the sale for cash of "liquid" types of property such
as securities, gold, or automobiles.296 However, the Guangdong statutes
mention encashment but provide no guidance on the proper procedures (if
there are any) for performing encashment. The statutes do not even specify
who is to perform the encashment.
VI. CONCLUSION
China's dramatic modernization has introduced dynamic and powerful
forces that will shape China in its future course. As discussed in this Article,
important changes have already occurred. If ongoing efforts to introduce
Western legal concepts and institutions continue to result in their
crystallization into practice, as they seem to be doing,297 China's legal
system will become more dependable for domestic and foreign economic
291. In China, ownership is a loaded term with somewhat different meaning than it has in the United
States. I have chosen "rights of possession" to distinguish ownership in the two countries. The two terms
are becoming more synonymous with the passage of time. Property owners in China are beginning to have
more freedom to transfer, convey, and alienate their rights of possession in land and other property. In
some ways this occurs despite government efforts to curb such activity. Real estate speculation, one
example of such activity, has been a large problem for the past two years.
292. Guangdong Secured Loans, supra note 81, arts. 27-29.
293. Zheng Interview (July 21, 1994), supra note 165. One recent example of this particular method
involved the Garden Hotel in Guilin which was turned over to the lenders after the mortgagor failed to
keep up on its mortgage payments.
294. See Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 11-13.
295. See Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 13.
296. See Liu & Reed, supra note 92, at 13.
297. See Jones, Questions, supra note 14; see also Frank Munger, Law, Change, and Litigation: A
Critical Examination of an Empirical Research Tradition, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 57, 77 (1988)
("Functional theory suggests that the need for intervention, at least in ongoing social relations, should not
be continuing but should peak and decline as adaptations become routinized.").
1996]
226 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 183
entities. Present trends will continue so long as marketization, modernization,
industrialization, and internationalization remain consonant with China's other
social goals.
One key to the future of China's system for taking and enforcing security
is the promulgation of the long awaited national security law.29 In addition
to being national in scope, the new law does not distinguish between foreign
and domestic parties.299 Although more detailed and extensive in coverage
than the local regulations discussed in this Article, the national security law
generally provides for the same types of security as discussed here.
The new law appears quite helpful since it clarifies at which state
agencies parties taking security should register, depending on the nature of the
collateral they offer to secure their mortgages."° It also provides that the
notarial authority of the place where the mortgagor is located shall be the
place for optional registration."' Information filed with registration
authorities is also to be made available for public perusal." ° Furthermore,
the new law explicitly provides priority rules with respect to all mortgages.
Registered mortgages take priority over mortgages registered later in time and
unregistered mortgages, 3  which in turn take priority over other
unregistered mortgages entered into later."°
The new security law represents a significant policy statement from the
central authorities and, as such, is very important. Yet, while it represents
significant developments in written law and as a matter of policy, it remains
to be seen how these changes can or will be implemented in practice.0 5 It
seems likely that varying location approaches to specific provisions (for
example in relation to fees charged for registration) will continue to
prevail.3" It is also unclear how long it will take for mandated changes to
be implemented (in relation to the length of time it will take for registered
documents to appear on a public register, for example)."7 Numerous
difficulties and complexities are certain to present themselves as the new law
is implemented.
Even with the new security law, it appears that the primary and clearest
source of creditor's security rights will continue to lie in the approved written
agreement between debtor and creditor." Fundamental issues relating to
298. Security Law, supra note 4.
299. Cheng & Leung, supra note 137, at 1.
300. See Security Law, supra note 4, art. 42.
301. Security Law, supra note 4, art. 43.
302. Security Law, supra note 4, art. 45.
303. Security Law, supra note 4, art. 54(i).
304. Security Law, supra note 4, art. 54(ii).
305. Cheng & Leung, supra note 137, at 6.
306. Cheng & Leung, supra note 137, at 6.
307. Cheng & Leung, supra note 137, at 6.
308. See Oechsli, supra note 3, at 22-23 ("The most common alternatives [to a secured transaction]
are to obtain payment guarantees from an authorized Chinese source or to lease the property that is
purchased with the foreign creditor's funds to the Chinese venture."). See generally Cheng & Leung,
supra note 137, at 1 (discussing Security Law's recognition of general principle of freedom of contract);
William C. Jones, The New General Rules: A Realistic Perspective on Chinese CivilLaw, E. AsiAN EXEc.
REP., Sept. 15, 1986, at 9, i1 (stating that legal relations between foreigners and Chinese are mostly
governed by contract); Henry R. Zheng, A Comparative Analysis of the Foreign Economic Contract Law
of the People's Republic of China, 3 CHINA L. REP. 227, 257 (1986) (discussing types of contracts in
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enforcement will not be resolved for a long time. However, present national
and local policies in China favor the ability of parties, both domestic and
foreign, to take security in China. Therefore, the Chinese system on paper
and in practice will continue developing to resemble United States and other
Western models even more closely.
Chinese foreign investment); Richard J. Goossen, Chinese Contract Law and the New Civil Code, E.
AsIAN EXEC. REP., July 15, 1986, at 9, 12 (discussing evolution of contract law in Chinese Civil Code).
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